2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
27 #include "auth/auth.h"
28 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
29 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
30 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
31 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
32 #include "param/param.h"
33 #include "param/secrets.h"
34 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
35 #include "system/kerberos.h"
36 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
38 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
39 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
40 #include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
41 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h"
42 #include "lib/messaging/irpc.h"
47 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
48 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
50 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(kvno) \
51 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF))
53 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
54 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
55 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
57 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
58 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
59 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
61 enum trust_direction {
63 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
64 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
67 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
74 "msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo",
78 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
83 send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a
84 REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets
86 static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
87 struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
88 struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
89 struct ldb_dn *user_dn)
91 struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle;
92 struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r;
93 struct tevent_req *req;
96 tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
97 if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
101 irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx,
104 if (irpc_handle == NULL) {
105 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n"));
106 TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
110 r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn);
113 * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation,
114 * which delivers the message in the _send function.
116 * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register
117 * a callback and wait for it to be triggered!
119 req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx,
124 /* we aren't interested in a reply */
126 TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
129 static time_t ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, time_t default_val)
135 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
139 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
147 static struct SDBFlags uf2SDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
149 struct SDBFlags flags = int2SDBFlags(0);
151 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
154 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
159 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
162 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
163 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
164 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
170 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
171 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
176 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
177 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
182 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
183 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
189 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
190 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
193 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
194 flags.locked_out = 1;
197 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
202 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
204 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
208 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
211 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
215 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
216 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
218 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
219 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
221 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
223 * this is confusing...
225 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
230 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
231 * => trusted_for_delegation
233 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
235 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
236 flags.forwardable = 1;
240 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
241 flags.require_preauth = 0;
243 flags.require_preauth = 1;
246 if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
247 flags.no_auth_data_reqd = 1;
253 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
255 if (p->db_entry != NULL) {
257 * A sdb_entry still has a reference
262 if (p->kdc_entry != NULL) {
264 * hdb_entry or krb5_db_entry still
265 * have a reference...
274 * Sort keys in descending order of strength.
276 * Explanaton from Greg Hudson:
278 * To encrypt tickets only the first returned key is used by the MIT KDC. The
279 * other keys just communicate support for session key enctypes, and aren't
280 * really used. The encryption key for the ticket enc part doesn't have
281 * to be of a type requested by the client. The session key enctype is chosen
282 * based on the client preference order, limited by the set of enctypes present
283 * in the server keys (unless the string attribute is set on the server
284 * principal overriding that set).
287 static int sdb_key_strength_priority(krb5_enctype etype)
289 static const krb5_enctype etype_list[] = {
290 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
291 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
292 ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
293 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
301 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list); i++) {
302 if (etype == etype_list[i]) {
307 return ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list) - i;
310 static int sdb_key_strength_cmp(const struct sdb_key *k1, const struct sdb_key *k2)
312 int p1 = sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k1->key));
313 int p2 = sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k2->key));
321 * Higher priority comes first
329 static void samba_kdc_sort_keys(struct sdb_keys *keys)
335 TYPESAFE_QSORT(keys->val, keys->len, sdb_key_strength_cmp);
338 int samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(krb5_context context,
339 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
340 const struct ldb_val *secretbuffer,
342 struct sdb_keys *keys)
344 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
345 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
350 keys->val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
351 if (keys->val == NULL) {
352 memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
358 supported_enctypes &= ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
361 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
362 struct sdb_key key = {};
364 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
365 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
367 MIN(secretbuffer->length, 32),
370 memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
374 keys->val[keys->len] = key;
378 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
379 struct sdb_key key = {};
381 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
382 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
384 MIN(secretbuffer->length, 16),
387 memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
391 keys->val[keys->len] = key;
395 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
396 struct sdb_key key = {};
398 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
399 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
401 MIN(secretbuffer->length, 16),
404 memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
408 keys->val[keys->len] = key;
417 static int samba_kdc_set_random_keys(krb5_context context,
418 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
419 struct sdb_keys *keys,
422 struct ldb_val secret_val;
423 uint8_t secretbuffer[32];
426 * Fake keys until we have a better way to reject
427 * non-pkinit requests.
429 * We just need to indicate which encryption types are
432 generate_secret_buffer(secretbuffer, sizeof(secretbuffer));
434 secret_val = data_blob_const(secretbuffer,
435 sizeof(secretbuffer));
436 return samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx,
443 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
444 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
446 struct ldb_message *msg,
449 uint32_t userAccountControl,
450 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
451 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex,
453 uint32_t *supported_enctypes_out)
455 struct sdb_entry *entry = &entry_ex->entry;
456 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
457 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
458 struct samr_Password *hash;
459 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
460 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
461 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
462 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
463 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
464 bool is_krbtgt = false;
465 int krbtgt_number = 0;
466 uint32_t current_kvno;
467 uint32_t returned_kvno = 0;
469 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
470 uint32_t supported_enctypes
471 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
472 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
474 *supported_enctypes_out = 0;
476 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
479 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
480 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
483 enable_fast = lpcfg_kdc_enable_fast(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
485 supported_enctypes |= ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED;
487 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
488 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
489 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
490 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
491 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
492 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
493 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
496 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
497 * to export into a keytab */
498 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
501 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
502 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
503 supported_enctypes = 0;
505 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
506 supported_enctypes |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
510 supported_enctypes &= ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
513 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
515 krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
517 if (krbtgt_number == -1) {
520 if (krbtgt_number == 0) {
525 if ((ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT)
526 && (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED)) {
527 ret = samba_kdc_set_random_keys(context,
532 *supported_enctypes_out = supported_enctypes;
537 current_kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
540 * Even for the main krbtgt account
541 * we have to strictly split the kvno into
542 * two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
543 * need to be all zero, even if
544 * the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
547 * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
549 current_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(current_kvno);
552 /* Get keys from the db */
554 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
555 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
557 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
562 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
564 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
565 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
566 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
567 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
572 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
573 if (scb.sub.num_packages != 0) {
574 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
580 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
581 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
582 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
583 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
592 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys element
593 * of supplementalCredentials
595 * The legacy Primary:Kerberos only contains
596 * single DES keys, which are completely ignored
602 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
608 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
609 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
610 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
611 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
613 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
614 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
618 if (_pkb.version != 4) {
620 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
621 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
625 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
626 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
629 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
630 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
631 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
632 auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(kdc_db_ctx, kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx,
633 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx, msg->dn);
634 return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
637 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
638 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
639 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
643 /* allocate space to decode into */
644 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
645 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
646 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
651 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
652 struct sdb_key key = {};
654 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
655 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
663 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
664 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
666 *supported_enctypes_out |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
670 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
671 struct sdb_key key = {};
672 uint32_t enctype_bit;
674 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
676 enctype_bit = kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype);
677 if (!(enctype_bit & supported_enctypes)) {
681 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
684 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
686 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
687 if (key.salt == NULL) {
692 key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT;
694 ret = smb_krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt,
704 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
706 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
707 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
708 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
709 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
713 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &key.salt->salt);
717 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
718 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
719 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
726 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
727 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
729 *supported_enctypes_out |= enctype_bit;
733 /* Set FAST support bits */
734 *supported_enctypes_out |= supported_enctypes & (ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED |
735 ENC_COMPOUND_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED |
736 ENC_CLAIMS_SUPPORTED);
738 returned_kvno = current_kvno;
741 * Even for the main krbtgt account
742 * we have to strictly split the kvno into
743 * two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
744 * need to be all zero, even if
745 * the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
748 * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
750 returned_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(returned_kvno, krbtgt_number);
752 entry->kvno = returned_kvno;
756 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
757 } else if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len > 0 &&
758 entry_ex->entry.keys.val != NULL) {
759 samba_kdc_sort_keys(&entry_ex->entry.keys);
761 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
762 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
763 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
768 static int principal_comp_strcmp_int(krb5_context context,
769 krb5_const_principal principal,
770 unsigned int component,
777 #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_COMP_STRING)
778 p = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, component);
785 if (component >= krb5_princ_size(context, principal)) {
789 d = krb5_princ_component(context, principal, component);
798 return strncasecmp(p, string, len);
800 return strncmp(p, string, len);
804 static int principal_comp_strcasecmp(krb5_context context,
805 krb5_const_principal principal,
806 unsigned int component,
809 return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal,
810 component, string, true);
813 static int principal_comp_strcmp(krb5_context context,
814 krb5_const_principal principal,
815 unsigned int component,
818 return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal,
819 component, string, false);
823 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
825 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
826 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
828 krb5_const_principal principal,
829 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
831 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
832 struct ldb_message *msg,
833 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
835 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
836 uint32_t userAccountControl;
837 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
838 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
839 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
840 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
841 uint32_t supported_enctypes = 0;
844 bool protected_user = false;
846 bool is_rodc = false;
847 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
848 struct ldb_val computer_val = data_blob_string_const("computer");
849 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
851 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry_ex);
853 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
857 if (!samAccountName) {
859 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
863 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
865 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
869 p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
875 p->is_rodc = is_rodc;
876 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
877 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
883 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
885 entry_ex->entry.skdc_entry = p;
887 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
889 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
890 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
891 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
895 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
896 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
897 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
898 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
900 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
902 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
903 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
906 userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
910 * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
911 * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
914 * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
915 * get back the whole principal as-sent
917 * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
918 * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
921 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
924 if (flags & (SDB_F_CANON|SDB_F_FORCE_CANON)) {
926 * When requested to do so, ensure that the
927 * both realm values in the principal are set
928 * to the upper case, canonical realm
930 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal,
931 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "krbtgt",
932 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), NULL);
934 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
937 smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
939 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
941 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
945 * this appears to be required regardless of
946 * the canonicalize flag from the client
948 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
950 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
955 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
956 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
958 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
961 } else if ((flags & SDB_F_FORCE_CANON) ||
962 ((flags & SDB_F_CANON) && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ))) {
964 * SDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
965 * packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
966 * and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the AS-REQ case
968 * The SDB_F_FORCE_CANON if for new MIT KDC code that wants
969 * the canonical name in all lookups, and takes care to
970 * canonicalize only when appropriate.
972 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
974 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
978 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
980 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
984 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
985 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
986 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
987 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
988 * we determine from our records */
990 /* this has to be with malloc() */
991 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
993 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
998 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
999 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2SDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
1002 * Take control of the returned principal here, rather than
1003 * allowing the Heimdal code to do it as we have specific
1004 * behaviour around the forced realm to honour
1006 entry_ex->entry.flags.force_canonicalize = true;
1008 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
1009 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
1010 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
1011 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
1013 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
1014 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
1015 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
1016 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
1021 * We restrict a 3-part SPN ending in my domain/realm to full
1022 * domain controllers.
1024 * This avoids any cases where (eg) a demoted DC still has
1025 * these more restricted SPNs.
1027 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > 2) {
1029 = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx,
1034 lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx,
1036 bool is_dc = userAccountControl &
1037 (UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT);
1038 if (is_our_realm && !is_dc) {
1039 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
1043 * To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
1044 * not just return the entry without .server set, we must
1045 * pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
1046 * return ERR_POLICY instead of
1047 * KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
1049 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && entry_ex->entry.flags.server == 0) {
1050 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1051 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
1054 if (flags & SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
1055 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
1056 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
1057 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
1060 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1061 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
1062 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1064 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1065 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
1066 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
1068 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1072 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (struct sdb_event *) malloc(sizeof(struct sdb_event));
1073 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
1075 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
1079 /* use 'whenChanged' */
1080 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
1081 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1082 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1083 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
1084 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
1086 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1092 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
1093 * virtue of being that particular RID */
1094 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
1096 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1101 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
1104 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
1105 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1107 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1108 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1110 realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
1111 mem_ctx, context, principal);
1112 if (realm == NULL) {
1117 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
1118 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
1119 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
1120 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
1121 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
1122 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) == 2
1123 && (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, "kadmin") == 0)
1124 && (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 1, "changepw") == 0)
1125 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm)) {
1126 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
1131 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
1132 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
1133 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
1134 } else if (is_rodc) {
1135 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
1136 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
1139 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
1140 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1142 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
1143 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
1144 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1145 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1147 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
1148 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
1149 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
1150 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
1151 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
1152 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
1154 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
1155 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
1156 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
1158 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
1159 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1162 NTTIME must_change_time
1163 = samdb_result_nttime(msg,
1164 "msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed",
1166 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
1167 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1169 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
1170 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
1174 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
1177 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
1178 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
1179 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
1181 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
1182 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
1186 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
1190 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
1192 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
1193 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
1198 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
1199 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
1200 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
1201 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
1203 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
1204 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
1207 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_renew));
1208 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
1213 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
1215 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)) {
1217 struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL;
1219 * These protections only apply to clients, so servers in the
1220 * Protected Users group may still have service tickets to them
1221 * encrypted with RC4. For accounts looked up as servers, note
1222 * that 'msg' does not contain the 'memberOf' attribute for
1223 * determining whether the account is a member of Protected
1226 * Additionally, Microsoft advises that accounts for services
1227 * and computers should never be members of Protected Users, or
1228 * they may fail to authenticate.
1230 status = samba_kdc_get_user_info_from_db(p, msg, &user_info_dc);
1231 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1236 result = dsdb_is_protected_user(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1238 user_info_dc->num_sids);
1244 protected_user = result;
1246 if (protected_user) {
1247 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(*entry_ex->entry.max_life, 4 * 60 * 60);
1248 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = MIN(*entry_ex->entry.max_renew, 4 * 60 * 60);
1250 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 0;
1251 entry_ex->entry.flags.proxiable = 0;
1255 /* Get keys from the db */
1256 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
1257 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
1258 ent_type, entry_ex, protected_user, &supported_enctypes);
1260 /* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */
1264 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1265 p->supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes;
1269 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1270 sdb_free_entry(entry_ex);
1272 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, p);
1279 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
1280 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
1282 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
1283 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1284 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
1285 enum trust_direction direction,
1286 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1289 struct ldb_message *msg,
1290 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1292 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1293 const char *our_realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
1294 char *partner_realm = NULL;
1295 const char *realm = NULL;
1296 const char *krbtgt_realm = NULL;
1297 DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
1298 DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
1299 struct samr_Password _password_hash;
1300 const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
1301 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
1302 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
1303 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
1304 bool use_previous = false;
1305 uint32_t current_kvno;
1306 uint32_t previous_kvno;
1307 uint32_t num_keys = 0;
1308 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
1311 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
1314 uint32_t *auth_kvno;
1315 bool preferr_current = false;
1316 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
1317 struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
1320 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry_ex);
1322 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
1323 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
1324 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
1325 supported_enctypes);
1328 status = dsdb_trust_parse_tdo_info(mem_ctx, msg, &tdo);
1329 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1330 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1335 if (!(tdo->trust_direction & direction)) {
1336 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1337 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1341 if (tdo->trust_type != LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL) {
1343 * Only UPLEVEL domains support kerberos here,
1344 * as we don't support LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT.
1346 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1347 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1351 if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION) {
1353 * We don't support selective authentication yet.
1355 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1356 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1360 if (tdo->domain_name.string == NULL) {
1361 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1362 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1365 partner_realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, tdo->domain_name.string);
1366 if (partner_realm == NULL) {
1367 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1372 if (direction == INBOUND) {
1374 krbtgt_realm = partner_realm;
1376 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
1377 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
1378 realm = partner_realm;
1379 krbtgt_realm = our_realm;
1381 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
1384 if (password_val == NULL) {
1385 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1386 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1390 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
1391 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
1392 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
1393 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1398 p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1405 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
1406 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
1407 p->supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes;
1409 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
1411 entry_ex->entry.skdc_entry = p;
1413 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1414 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
1415 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1416 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1417 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
1418 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
1420 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1425 * We always need to generate the canonicalized principal
1426 * with the values of our database.
1428 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm,
1429 "krbtgt", krbtgt_realm, NULL);
1431 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1434 smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry_ex->entry.principal,
1437 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
1439 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
1440 * the previous password hash.
1441 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
1442 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
1443 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
1444 * then we use the previous substrucure.
1448 * Windows preferrs the previous key for one hour.
1450 tv = timeval_current();
1451 if (tv.tv_sec > 3600) {
1454 an_hour_ago = timeval_to_nttime(&tv);
1456 /* first work out the current kvno */
1458 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
1459 struct AuthenticationInformation *a =
1460 &password_blob.current.array[i];
1462 if (a->LastUpdateTime <= an_hour_ago) {
1463 preferr_current = true;
1466 if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
1467 current_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version;
1470 if (current_kvno == 0) {
1471 previous_kvno = 255;
1473 previous_kvno = current_kvno - 1;
1475 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
1476 struct AuthenticationInformation *a =
1477 &password_blob.previous.array[i];
1479 if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
1480 previous_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version;
1484 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
1486 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
1487 /* there is no previous password */
1488 use_previous = false;
1489 } else if (!(flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED)) {
1491 * If not specified we use the lowest kvno
1492 * for the first hour after an update.
1494 if (preferr_current) {
1495 use_previous = false;
1496 } else if (previous_kvno < current_kvno) {
1497 use_previous = true;
1499 use_previous = false;
1501 } else if (kvno == current_kvno) {
1505 use_previous = false;
1506 } else if (kvno == previous_kvno) {
1510 use_previous = true;
1513 * Fallback to the current one for anything else
1515 use_previous = false;
1519 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
1520 auth_kvno = &previous_kvno;
1522 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
1523 auth_kvno = ¤t_kvno;
1526 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
1527 if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1528 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
1530 entry_ex->entry.kvno = *auth_kvno;
1533 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
1534 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
1537 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
1538 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
1539 if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
1543 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1544 mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
1545 if (password_hash == NULL) {
1548 password_hash = &_password_hash;
1551 if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
1555 ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
1556 CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
1557 password_utf16.data,
1558 password_utf16.length,
1559 (void *)&password_utf8.data,
1560 &password_utf8.length);
1562 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1567 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1570 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1574 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
1575 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1576 password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
1582 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
1583 if (num_keys == 0) {
1584 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
1585 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1586 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1590 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
1591 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
1592 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1597 if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
1598 struct sdb_key key = {};
1599 krb5_const_principal salt_principal = entry_ex->entry.principal;
1601 krb5_data cleartext_data;
1603 cleartext_data.data = discard_const_p(char, password_utf8.data);
1604 cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
1606 ret = smb_krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
1613 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1614 ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context,
1618 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1621 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
1625 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1626 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1629 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1630 ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context,
1634 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1637 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
1641 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1642 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1645 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
1648 if (password_hash != NULL) {
1649 struct sdb_key key = {};
1651 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
1652 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
1653 password_hash->hash,
1654 sizeof(password_hash->hash),
1660 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1661 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1664 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2SDBFlags(0);
1665 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
1666 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1667 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1668 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
1670 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1672 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
1674 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
1676 /* Match Windows behavior and allow forwardable flag in cross-realm. */
1677 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
1679 samba_kdc_sort_keys(&entry_ex->entry.keys);
1681 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1684 TALLOC_FREE(partner_realm);
1687 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1688 sdb_free_entry(entry_ex);
1690 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, p);
1697 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1698 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1700 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1701 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1704 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1706 status = dsdb_trust_search_tdo(ldb_ctx, realm, realm,
1707 attrs, mem_ctx, pmsg);
1708 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1710 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) {
1711 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1712 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1714 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
1718 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
1723 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1724 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1725 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1726 krb5_const_principal principal,
1728 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1729 struct ldb_message **msg)
1732 char *principal_string = NULL;
1734 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1735 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context,
1737 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1741 char *principal_string_m = NULL;
1742 krb5_error_code ret;
1744 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string_m);
1749 principal_string = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, principal_string_m);
1750 SAFE_FREE(principal_string_m);
1751 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1756 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1757 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1759 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1760 krb5_principal fallback_principal = NULL;
1761 unsigned int num_comp;
1762 char *fallback_realm = NULL;
1763 char *fallback_account = NULL;
1764 krb5_error_code ret;
1766 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string,
1767 &fallback_principal);
1768 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
1773 num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, fallback_principal);
1774 fallback_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
1775 mem_ctx, context, fallback_principal);
1776 if (fallback_realm == NULL) {
1777 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1781 if (num_comp == 1) {
1784 fallback_account = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx,
1785 context, fallback_principal, 0);
1786 if (fallback_account == NULL) {
1787 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1788 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
1792 len = strlen(fallback_account);
1793 if (len >= 2 && fallback_account[len - 1] == '$') {
1794 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account);
1797 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1798 fallback_principal = NULL;
1800 if (fallback_account != NULL) {
1803 with_dollar = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s$",
1805 if (with_dollar == NULL) {
1806 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
1809 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account);
1811 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1812 &fallback_principal,
1815 TALLOC_FREE(with_dollar);
1817 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
1821 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
1823 if (fallback_principal != NULL) {
1824 char *fallback_string = NULL;
1826 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context,
1830 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1834 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1839 SAFE_FREE(fallback_string);
1841 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1842 fallback_principal = NULL;
1844 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
1846 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1847 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1848 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1850 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1857 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1858 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1859 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1860 krb5_const_principal principal,
1862 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1863 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1864 krb5_error_code ret;
1865 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1867 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1868 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1874 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1875 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1877 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1881 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1882 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1883 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1884 krb5_const_principal principal,
1887 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1889 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1890 krb5_error_code ret;
1891 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1892 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1893 char *realm_from_princ;
1894 char *realm_princ_comp = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 1);
1896 realm_from_princ = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
1897 mem_ctx, context, principal);
1898 if (realm_from_princ == NULL) {
1900 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1903 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 2
1904 || (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1906 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1909 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1911 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_from_princ)
1912 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_princ_comp)) {
1913 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1914 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1915 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1919 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1920 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
1921 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
1922 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
1923 if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1924 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1925 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1926 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1927 return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1931 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1934 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1935 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1936 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1937 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1938 "(objectClass=user)");
1940 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1941 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1942 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1943 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1944 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1946 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1947 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1950 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1951 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1952 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1953 krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1954 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1955 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1956 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1957 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1958 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1959 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1960 krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1961 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1962 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1963 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1966 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1967 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1968 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1970 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1975 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1976 const char *realm = NULL;
1978 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1980 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), realm_from_princ) == 0) {
1981 /* look for inbound trust */
1982 direction = INBOUND;
1983 realm = realm_princ_comp;
1984 } else if (principal_comp_strcasecmp(context, principal, 1, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx)) == 0) {
1985 /* look for outbound trust */
1986 direction = OUTBOUND;
1987 realm = realm_from_princ;
1989 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1992 krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1995 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1998 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
2000 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
2002 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
2005 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
2006 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
2010 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2011 principal, direction,
2012 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
2014 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
2015 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
2016 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
2017 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
2018 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
2025 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
2026 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2027 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
2028 krb5_const_principal principal,
2031 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
2032 struct ldb_message **msg)
2034 krb5_error_code ret;
2035 if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL)
2036 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) >= 2) {
2037 /* 'normal server' case */
2040 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
2041 char *principal_string;
2043 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
2044 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
2050 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
2051 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
2052 * referral instead */
2053 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
2054 mem_ctx, principal_string,
2055 &user_dn, realm_dn);
2056 free(principal_string);
2058 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
2059 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2062 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
2064 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
2066 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2068 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2069 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2072 } else if (!(flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)
2073 && smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
2075 * The behaviour of accepting an
2076 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
2077 * containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
2078 * not AS-REQ packets.
2080 return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
2081 mem_ctx, principal, attrs,
2086 * - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
2087 * samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
2088 * matter if the name is an
2089 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
2090 * - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
2091 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
2092 * only lookup samAccountName based names.
2096 krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
2097 krb5_const_principal used_principal = NULL;
2100 char *filter = NULL;
2102 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
2104 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
2105 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 1) {
2106 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
2107 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
2108 "enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
2109 krb5_princ_size(context, principal));
2112 str = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 0);
2114 return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
2116 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, str,
2117 &enterprise_principal);
2122 used_principal = enterprise_principal;
2124 used_principal = principal;
2127 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
2128 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
2130 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
2132 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, used_principal,
2133 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM |
2134 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
2136 used_principal = NULL;
2137 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
2138 enterprise_principal = NULL;
2141 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
2142 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
2146 name1 = ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ);
2147 SAFE_FREE(short_princ);
2148 if (name1 == NULL) {
2151 len1 = strlen(name1);
2152 if (len1 >= 1 && name1[len1 - 1] != '$') {
2153 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
2154 "(&(objectClass=user)(|(samAccountName=%s)(samAccountName=%s$)))",
2156 if (filter == NULL) {
2160 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
2161 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
2163 if (filter == NULL) {
2168 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
2169 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
2171 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2173 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
2174 DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find an entry for %s filter:%s\n",
2176 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2178 if (lret == LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) {
2179 DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find unique entry for %s filter:%s\n",
2181 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2183 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2184 DEBUG(0, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
2185 name1, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2186 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2190 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2195 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
2196 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2197 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
2198 krb5_const_principal principal,
2200 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
2202 krb5_error_code ret;
2203 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2204 struct ldb_message *msg;
2206 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
2207 flags, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
2212 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2213 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
2215 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
2217 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
2223 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_realm(krb5_context context,
2224 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2225 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
2226 krb5_const_principal principal,
2228 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
2230 TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
2232 krb5_error_code ret;
2233 bool check_realm = false;
2234 const char *realm = NULL;
2235 struct dsdb_trust_routing_table *trt = NULL;
2236 const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
2237 unsigned int num_comp;
2241 num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, principal);
2243 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
2244 if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) {
2248 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
2249 if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ) {
2259 realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(frame, context, principal);
2260 if (realm == NULL) {
2266 * The requested realm needs to be our own
2268 ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm);
2271 * The request is not for us...
2274 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2277 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
2278 char *principal_string = NULL;
2279 krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
2280 char *enterprise_realm = NULL;
2282 if (num_comp != 1) {
2284 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2287 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame, context,
2289 if (principal_string == NULL) {
2294 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string,
2295 &enterprise_principal);
2296 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
2302 enterprise_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
2303 frame, context, enterprise_principal);
2304 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
2305 if (enterprise_realm != NULL) {
2306 realm = enterprise_realm;
2310 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
2311 char *service_realm = NULL;
2313 ret = principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME);
2316 * we need to search krbtgt/ locally
2323 * We need to check the last component against the routing table.
2325 * Note this works only with 2 or 3 component principals, e.g:
2327 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base
2328 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/bla.base
2329 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/ForestDnsZones.bla.base
2330 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/DomainDnsZones.bla.base
2333 if (num_comp == 2 || num_comp == 3) {
2334 service_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame,
2340 if (service_realm != NULL) {
2341 realm = service_realm;
2345 ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm);
2348 * skip the expensive routing lookup
2354 status = dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
2356 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
2361 tdo = dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt, realm);
2364 * This principal has to be local
2370 if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST) {
2372 * TODO: handle the routing within the forest
2374 * This should likely be handled in
2375 * samba_kdc_message2entry() in case we're
2376 * a global catalog. We'd need to check
2377 * if realm_dn is our own domain and derive
2378 * the dns domain name from realm_dn and check that
2379 * against the routing table or fallback to
2380 * the tdo we found here.
2382 * But for now we don't support multiple domains
2383 * in our forest correctly anyway.
2385 * Just search in our local database.
2391 ZERO_STRUCT(entry_ex->entry);
2393 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal,
2394 &entry_ex->entry.principal);
2400 upper = strupper_talloc(frame, tdo->domain_name.string);
2401 if (upper == NULL) {
2406 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context,
2407 entry_ex->entry.principal,
2415 return SDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
2418 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
2419 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2420 krb5_const_principal principal,
2423 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
2425 krb5_error_code ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2426 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
2428 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
2431 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
2435 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_realm(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2436 principal, flags, entry_ex);
2441 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2443 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
2444 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
2445 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2447 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
2448 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
2449 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
2450 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2452 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
2453 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
2454 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2456 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
2457 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
2458 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2462 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2466 struct samba_kdc_seq {
2469 struct ldb_message **msgs;
2470 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2473 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
2474 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2475 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry)
2477 krb5_error_code ret;
2478 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
2479 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
2480 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
2481 const char *sAMAccountName = NULL;
2482 krb5_principal principal = NULL;
2483 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
2486 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2489 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
2493 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
2497 while (priv->index < priv->count) {
2498 msg = priv->msgs[priv->index++];
2500 sAMAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "sAMAccountName", NULL);
2501 if (sAMAccountName != NULL) {
2506 if (sAMAccountName == NULL) {
2507 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2511 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &principal,
2512 realm, sAMAccountName, NULL);
2517 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2518 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
2519 SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|SDB_F_GET_ANY,
2520 priv->realm_dn, msg, entry);
2523 if (principal != NULL) {
2524 krb5_free_principal(context, principal);
2529 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
2531 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2537 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
2538 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2539 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry)
2541 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
2542 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
2544 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
2545 krb5_error_code ret;
2546 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
2551 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
2554 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
2557 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
2563 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
2566 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
2570 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
2574 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
2579 krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
2581 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
2582 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
2583 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2584 "(objectClass=user)");
2586 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2588 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2591 priv->count = res->count;
2592 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
2595 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
2597 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
2601 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
2603 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2608 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
2609 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2610 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry)
2612 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
2615 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
2617 * The safest way to determine 'self' is to check the DB record made at
2618 * the time the principal was presented to the KDC.
2621 samba_kdc_check_client_matches_target_service(krb5_context context,
2622 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry_client,
2623 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry_server_target)
2625 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
2626 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
2627 TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
2629 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(frame,
2630 skdc_entry_client->msg,
2632 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(frame,
2633 skdc_entry_server_target->msg,
2637 * Allow delegation to the same record (representing a
2638 * principal), even if by a different name. The easy and safe
2639 * way to prove this is by SID comparison
2641 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
2643 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
2650 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
2651 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
2652 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
2656 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
2657 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2658 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
2659 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
2661 krb5_error_code ret;
2662 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2663 struct ldb_message *msg;
2664 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
2665 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
2666 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
2670 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
2674 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
2678 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
2679 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
2680 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
2683 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2687 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, skdc_entry->msg, "objectSid");
2688 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
2690 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
2691 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
2693 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
2694 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2695 #if defined(KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH) /* MIT */
2696 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
2697 #else /* Heimdal (where this is an enum) */
2698 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
2702 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2707 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
2711 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
2712 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2713 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
2714 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
2716 krb5_error_code ret;
2718 const char *client_dn = NULL;
2719 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
2720 struct ldb_message_element *el;
2725 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
2729 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2730 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2731 " talloc_named() failed!");
2735 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(skdc_entry->msg->dn);
2741 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2742 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2743 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
2747 el = ldb_msg_find_element(skdc_entry->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
2752 SMB_ASSERT(el->num_values != 0);
2755 * This is the Microsoft forwardable flag behavior.
2757 * If the proxy (target) principal is NULL, and we have any authorized
2758 * delegation target, allow to forward.
2760 if (target_principal == NULL) {
2766 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
2767 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
2769 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
2770 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
2773 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
2774 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
2776 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2777 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2778 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2779 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
2782 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
2785 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
2787 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
2789 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2790 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2791 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
2795 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
2797 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
2798 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
2799 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
2802 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
2806 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
2807 (const char *)val2->data,
2822 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
2824 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2828 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2829 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
2830 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
2832 target_principal_name);
2833 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2834 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2838 * This method is called for S4U2Proxy requests and implements the
2839 * resource-based constrained delegation variant, which can support
2840 * cross-realm delegation.
2842 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd(
2843 krb5_context context,
2844 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2845 krb5_const_principal client_principal,
2846 krb5_const_principal server_principal,
2847 krb5_pac header_pac,
2848 struct samba_kdc_entry *proxy_skdc_entry)
2850 krb5_error_code code;
2851 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
2852 char *client_name = NULL;
2853 char *server_name = NULL;
2854 const char *proxy_dn = NULL;
2855 const DATA_BLOB *data = NULL;
2856 struct security_descriptor *rbcd_security_descriptor = NULL;
2857 struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL;
2858 struct auth_session_info *session_info = NULL;
2859 uint32_t session_info_flags = AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES;
2860 uint32_t access_desired = SEC_ADS_GENERIC_ALL; /* => 0x000f01ff */
2861 uint32_t access_granted = 0;
2863 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL;
2865 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx,
2867 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd");
2868 if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
2875 proxy_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(proxy_skdc_entry->msg->dn);
2876 if (proxy_dn == NULL) {
2877 DBG_ERR("ldb_dn_get_linearized failed for proxy_dn!\n");
2878 TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
2887 rbcd_security_descriptor = talloc_zero(mem_ctx,
2888 struct security_descriptor);
2889 if (rbcd_security_descriptor == NULL) {
2896 code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context,
2898 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
2901 DBG_ERR("Unable to parse client_principal!\n");
2905 code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context,
2907 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
2910 DBG_ERR("Unable to parse server_principal!\n");
2911 SAFE_FREE(client_name);
2915 DBG_INFO("Check delegation from client[%s] to server[%s] via "
2921 code = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx,
2931 if (user_info_dc->info->authenticated) {
2932 session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED;
2935 nt_status = auth_generate_session_info(mem_ctx,
2941 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
2942 code = map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
2946 data = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(proxy_skdc_entry->msg,
2947 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity");
2949 DBG_ERR("Could not find security descriptor"
2950 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity in "
2953 code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2957 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(
2960 rbcd_security_descriptor,
2961 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_security_descriptor);
2962 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
2963 errno = ndr_map_error2errno(ndr_err);
2964 DBG_ERR("Failed to unmarshall "
2965 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity "
2966 "security descriptor of proxy[%s]\n",
2968 code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2972 if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
2973 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_token, session_info->security_token);
2974 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, rbcd_security_descriptor);
2977 nt_status = sec_access_check_ds(rbcd_security_descriptor,
2978 session_info->security_token,
2984 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
2985 DBG_WARNING("RBCD: sec_access_check_ds(access_desired=%#08x, "
2986 "access_granted:%#08x) failed with: %s\n",
2989 nt_errstr(nt_status));
2991 code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2995 DBG_NOTICE("RBCD: Access granted for client[%s]\n", client_name);
2999 SAFE_FREE(client_name);
3000 SAFE_FREE(server_name);
3002 TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
3006 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
3007 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
3010 struct ldb_message *msg;
3011 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
3012 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
3013 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
3014 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
3017 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
3018 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
3021 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
3022 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
3023 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
3025 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
3026 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
3027 kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx = base_ctx->msg_ctx;
3029 /* get default kdc policy */
3030 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(mem_ctx,
3032 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
3033 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
3034 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
3036 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
3037 if (session_info == NULL) {
3038 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3041 /* Setup the link to secrets.ldb */
3043 kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db = secrets_db_connect(kdc_db_ctx,
3045 if (kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db == NULL) {
3046 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: "
3047 "Cannot open secrets.ldb for KDC backend!"));
3048 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3049 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3052 kdc_db_ctx->fx_cookie_dn = ldb_dn_new(kdc_db_ctx,
3053 kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db,
3056 /* Setup the link to LDB */
3057 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx,
3063 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
3064 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
3065 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3066 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3069 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
3070 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
3071 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
3072 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
3073 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
3074 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3075 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3077 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
3078 int my_krbtgt_number;
3079 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
3080 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
3081 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
3083 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
3084 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
3085 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3086 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3089 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
3090 "serverReference", &account_dn);
3091 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
3092 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
3093 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
3094 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3095 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3098 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
3099 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
3100 talloc_free(account_dn);
3101 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
3102 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
3103 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
3104 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3105 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3108 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
3109 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
3111 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
3112 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
3113 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
3114 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
3115 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
3116 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
3117 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
3118 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3119 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3121 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
3122 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
3123 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
3124 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
3126 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3127 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3129 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
3132 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
3133 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
3135 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
3138 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
3139 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
3141 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
3142 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
3143 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3144 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3146 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
3147 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
3150 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
3151 return NT_STATUS_OK;