2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
38 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h"
39 #include "lib/messaging/irpc.h"
42 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
43 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
45 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
46 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
47 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
49 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
50 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
51 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
53 enum trust_direction {
55 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
56 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
59 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
66 "msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo",
70 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
75 send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a
76 REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets
78 static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
79 struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
80 struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
81 struct ldb_dn *user_dn)
83 struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle;
84 struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r;
85 struct tevent_req *req;
88 tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
89 if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
93 irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx,
96 if (irpc_handle == NULL) {
97 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n"));
102 r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn);
105 * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation,
106 * which delivers the message in the _send function.
108 * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register
109 * a callback and wait for it to be triggered!
111 req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx,
116 /* we aren't interested in a reply */
118 TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
121 static time_t ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, time_t default_val)
127 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
131 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
139 static struct SDBFlags uf2SDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
141 struct SDBFlags flags = int2SDBFlags(0);
143 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
146 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
151 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
154 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
155 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
156 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
162 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
163 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
168 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
169 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
174 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
175 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
181 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
182 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
185 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
186 flags.locked_out = 1;
189 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
194 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
196 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
200 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
203 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
207 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
208 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
210 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
211 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
213 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
215 * this is confusing...
217 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
222 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
223 * => trusted_for_delegation
225 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
227 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
228 flags.forwardable = 1;
232 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
233 flags.require_preauth = 0;
235 flags.require_preauth = 1;
241 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
243 if (p->entry_ex != NULL) {
244 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
245 free_sdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
252 * Sort keys in descending order of strength.
254 * Explanaton from Greg Hudson:
256 * To encrypt tickets only the first returned key is used by the MIT KDC. The
257 * other keys just communicate support for session key enctypes, and aren't
258 * really used. The encryption key for the ticket enc part doesn't have
259 * to be of a type requested by the client. The session key enctype is chosen
260 * based on the client preference order, limited by the set of enctypes present
261 * in the server keys (unless the string attribute is set on the server
262 * principal overriding that set).
264 static int samba_kdc_sort_encryption_keys(struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
266 unsigned int i, j, idx = 0;
267 static const krb5_enctype etype_list[] = {
268 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
269 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
270 ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
271 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
277 size_t etype_len = ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list);
278 size_t keys_size = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
279 struct sdb_key *keys = entry_ex->entry.keys.val;
280 struct sdb_key *sorted_keys;
282 sorted_keys = calloc(keys_size, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
283 if (sorted_keys == NULL) {
287 for (i = 0; i < etype_len; i++) {
288 for (j = 0; j < keys_size; j++) {
289 const struct sdb_key skey = keys[j];
291 if (idx == keys_size) {
295 if (KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&skey.key) == etype_list[i]) {
296 sorted_keys[idx] = skey;
302 /* Paranoia: Something went wrong during data copy */
303 if (idx != keys_size) {
308 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
309 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = sorted_keys;
314 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
315 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
317 struct ldb_message *msg,
320 uint32_t userAccountControl,
321 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
322 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
324 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
325 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
326 struct samr_Password *hash;
327 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
328 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
329 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
330 bool newer_keys = false;
331 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
332 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
333 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
335 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
336 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
338 uint32_t supported_enctypes
339 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
340 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
343 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
344 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
345 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
346 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
347 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
348 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
349 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
350 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
351 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
352 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
355 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
356 * to export into a keytab */
357 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
360 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
361 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
362 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
364 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
365 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
368 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
370 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
372 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
377 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
378 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
379 entry_ex->entry.kvno = 0;
381 if ((ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT)
382 && (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED)) {
383 uint8_t secretbuffer[32];
386 * Fake keys until we have a better way to reject
387 * non-pkinit requests.
389 * We just need to indicate which encryption types are
392 generate_secret_buffer(secretbuffer, sizeof(secretbuffer));
395 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
396 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
397 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
398 ZERO_STRUCT(secretbuffer);
403 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
404 struct sdb_key key = {};
406 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
407 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
411 ZERO_STRUCT(secretbuffer);
415 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
416 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
419 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
420 struct sdb_key key = {};
422 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
423 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
427 ZERO_STRUCT(secretbuffer);
431 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
432 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
435 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
436 struct sdb_key key = {};
438 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
439 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
443 ZERO_STRUCT(secretbuffer);
447 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
448 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
455 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
457 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
459 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
461 /* Get keys from the db */
463 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
464 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
466 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
471 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
473 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
474 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
475 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
476 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
481 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
482 if (scb.sub.num_packages != 0) {
483 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
489 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
490 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
491 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
492 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
498 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
499 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
500 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
504 * we don't break here in hope to find
505 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
511 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
512 * of supplementalCredentials
517 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
523 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
524 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
525 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
526 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
528 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
529 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
533 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
535 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
536 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
540 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
542 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
543 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
547 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
548 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
549 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
550 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
551 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
552 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
556 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
557 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
558 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
559 auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(kdc_db_ctx, kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx,
560 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx, msg->dn);
561 return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
564 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
565 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
566 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
570 /* allocate space to decode into */
571 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
572 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
573 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
578 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
579 struct sdb_key key = {};
581 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
582 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
590 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
591 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
595 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
596 struct sdb_key key = {};
598 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
600 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
604 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
607 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
609 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
610 if (key.salt == NULL) {
615 key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT;
617 ret = smb_krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt,
627 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
629 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
630 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
631 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
632 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
634 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
635 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
636 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
642 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &key.salt->salt);
649 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
650 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
653 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
654 struct sdb_key key = {};
656 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
658 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
662 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
665 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
667 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
668 if (key.salt == NULL) {
673 key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT;
675 ret = smb_krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt,
685 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
686 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
687 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
688 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
692 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &key.salt->salt);
699 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
700 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
706 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
707 } else if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len > 0 &&
708 entry_ex->entry.keys.val != NULL) {
709 ret = samba_kdc_sort_encryption_keys(entry_ex);
711 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
715 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
716 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
717 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
722 static int principal_comp_strcmp_int(krb5_context context,
723 krb5_const_principal principal,
724 unsigned int component,
731 #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_COMP_STRING)
732 p = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, component);
739 if (component >= krb5_princ_size(context, principal)) {
743 d = krb5_princ_component(context, principal, component);
752 return strncasecmp(p, string, len);
754 return strncmp(p, string, len);
758 static int principal_comp_strcasecmp(krb5_context context,
759 krb5_const_principal principal,
760 unsigned int component,
763 return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal,
764 component, string, true);
767 static int principal_comp_strcmp(krb5_context context,
768 krb5_const_principal principal,
769 unsigned int component,
772 return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal,
773 component, string, false);
777 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
779 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
780 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
782 krb5_const_principal principal,
783 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
785 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
786 struct ldb_message *msg,
787 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
789 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
790 uint32_t userAccountControl;
791 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
792 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
793 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
795 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
800 bool is_rodc = false;
801 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
802 struct ldb_val computer_val;
803 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
804 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
805 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
807 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
811 if (!samAccountName) {
813 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
817 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
819 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
823 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry_ex);
825 p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
831 p->is_rodc = is_rodc;
832 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
833 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
839 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
843 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
845 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
846 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
847 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
851 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
852 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
853 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
854 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
856 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
858 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
859 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
862 userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
866 * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
867 * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
870 * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
871 * get back the whole principal as-sent
873 * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
874 * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
877 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
880 if (flags & (SDB_F_CANON)) {
882 * When requested to do so, ensure that the
883 * both realm values in the principal are set
884 * to the upper case, canonical realm
886 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal,
887 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "krbtgt",
888 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), NULL);
890 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
893 smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
895 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
897 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
901 * this appears to be required regardless of
902 * the canonicalize flag from the client
904 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
906 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
911 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
912 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
914 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
917 } else if (flags & SDB_F_CANON && flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) {
919 * SDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
920 * packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
921 * and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the AS-REQ case
923 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
925 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
929 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
931 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
935 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
936 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
937 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
938 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
939 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
940 * we determine from our records */
942 /* this has to be with malloc() */
943 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
945 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
951 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
952 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2SDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
954 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
955 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
956 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
957 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
959 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
960 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
961 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
962 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
966 * To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
967 * not just return the entry without .server set, we must
968 * pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
969 * return ERR_POLICY instead of
970 * KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
972 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && entry_ex->entry.flags.server == 0) {
973 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
974 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
977 if (flags & SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
978 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
979 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
980 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
983 /* use 'whenCreated' */
984 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
985 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
987 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
988 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
989 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
991 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
995 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (struct sdb_event *) malloc(sizeof(struct sdb_event));
996 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
998 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
1002 /* use 'whenChanged' */
1003 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
1004 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1005 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1006 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
1007 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
1009 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1015 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
1016 * virtue of being that particular RID */
1017 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
1019 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1024 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
1027 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
1028 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1030 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1031 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1033 realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1034 if (realm == NULL) {
1039 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
1040 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
1041 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
1042 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
1043 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
1044 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) == 2
1045 && (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, "kadmin") == 0)
1046 && (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 1, "changepw") == 0)
1047 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm)) {
1048 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
1053 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
1054 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
1055 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
1056 } else if (is_rodc) {
1057 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
1058 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
1061 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
1062 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1064 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
1065 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
1066 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1067 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1069 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
1070 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
1071 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
1072 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
1073 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
1074 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
1076 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
1077 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
1078 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
1080 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
1081 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1084 NTTIME must_change_time
1085 = samdb_result_nttime(msg,
1086 "msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed",
1088 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
1089 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1091 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
1092 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
1096 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
1099 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
1100 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
1101 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
1103 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
1104 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
1108 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
1112 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
1114 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
1115 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
1120 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
1121 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
1122 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
1123 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
1125 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
1126 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
1129 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
1130 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
1135 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
1137 /* Get keys from the db */
1138 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
1139 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
1140 ent_type, entry_ex);
1142 /* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */
1146 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1150 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1151 sdb_free_entry(entry_ex);
1152 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry_ex);
1154 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1161 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
1162 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
1164 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
1165 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1166 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
1167 enum trust_direction direction,
1168 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1171 struct ldb_message *msg,
1172 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1174 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1175 const char *our_realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
1176 char *partner_realm = NULL;
1177 const char *realm = NULL;
1178 const char *krbtgt_realm = NULL;
1179 DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
1180 DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
1181 struct samr_Password _password_hash;
1182 const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
1183 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
1184 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
1185 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
1186 bool use_previous = false;
1187 uint32_t current_kvno;
1188 uint32_t previous_kvno;
1189 uint32_t num_keys = 0;
1190 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
1193 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
1196 uint32_t *auth_kvno;
1197 bool preferr_current = false;
1198 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
1199 struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
1202 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
1203 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
1204 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
1205 supported_enctypes);
1208 status = dsdb_trust_parse_tdo_info(mem_ctx, msg, &tdo);
1209 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1210 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1215 if (!(tdo->trust_direction & direction)) {
1216 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1217 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1221 if (tdo->trust_type != LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL) {
1223 * Only UPLEVEL domains support kerberos here,
1224 * as we don't support LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT.
1226 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1227 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1231 if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION) {
1233 * We don't support selective authentication yet.
1235 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1236 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1240 if (tdo->domain_name.string == NULL) {
1241 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1242 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1245 partner_realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, tdo->domain_name.string);
1246 if (partner_realm == NULL) {
1247 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1252 if (direction == INBOUND) {
1254 krbtgt_realm = partner_realm;
1256 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
1257 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
1258 realm = partner_realm;
1259 krbtgt_realm = our_realm;
1261 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
1264 if (password_val == NULL) {
1265 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1266 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1270 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
1271 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
1272 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
1273 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1278 p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1285 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
1286 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
1288 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
1290 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
1291 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(struct sdb_entry));
1295 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1296 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
1297 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1298 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1299 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
1300 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
1302 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1307 * We always need to generate the canonicalized principal
1308 * with the values of our database.
1310 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm,
1311 "krbtgt", krbtgt_realm, NULL);
1313 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1316 smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry_ex->entry.principal,
1319 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
1321 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
1322 * the previous password hash.
1323 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
1324 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
1325 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
1326 * then we use the previous substrucure.
1330 * Windows preferrs the previous key for one hour.
1332 tv = timeval_current();
1333 if (tv.tv_sec > 3600) {
1336 an_hour_ago = timeval_to_nttime(&tv);
1338 /* first work out the current kvno */
1340 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
1341 struct AuthenticationInformation *a =
1342 &password_blob.current.array[i];
1344 if (a->LastUpdateTime <= an_hour_ago) {
1345 preferr_current = true;
1348 if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
1349 current_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version;
1352 if (current_kvno == 0) {
1353 previous_kvno = 255;
1355 previous_kvno = current_kvno - 1;
1357 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
1358 struct AuthenticationInformation *a =
1359 &password_blob.previous.array[i];
1361 if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
1362 previous_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version;
1366 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
1368 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
1369 /* there is no previous password */
1370 use_previous = false;
1371 } else if (!(flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED)) {
1373 * If not specified we use the lowest kvno
1374 * for the first hour after an update.
1376 if (preferr_current) {
1377 use_previous = false;
1378 } else if (previous_kvno < current_kvno) {
1379 use_previous = true;
1381 use_previous = false;
1383 } else if (kvno == current_kvno) {
1387 use_previous = false;
1388 } else if (kvno == previous_kvno) {
1392 use_previous = true;
1395 * Fallback to the current one for anything else
1397 use_previous = false;
1401 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
1402 auth_kvno = &previous_kvno;
1404 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
1405 auth_kvno = ¤t_kvno;
1408 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
1409 if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1410 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
1412 entry_ex->entry.kvno = *auth_kvno;
1415 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
1416 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
1419 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
1420 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
1421 if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
1425 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1426 mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
1427 if (password_hash == NULL) {
1430 password_hash = &_password_hash;
1433 if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
1437 ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
1438 CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
1439 password_utf16.data,
1440 password_utf16.length,
1441 (void *)&password_utf8.data,
1442 &password_utf8.length);
1444 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1449 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1452 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1456 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
1457 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1458 password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
1464 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
1465 if (num_keys == 0) {
1466 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
1467 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1468 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1472 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
1473 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
1474 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1479 if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
1480 struct sdb_key key = {};
1481 krb5_const_principal salt_principal = entry_ex->entry.principal;
1483 krb5_data cleartext_data;
1485 cleartext_data.data = discard_const_p(char, password_utf8.data);
1486 cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
1488 ret = smb_krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
1495 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1496 ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context,
1500 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1503 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
1507 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1508 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1511 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1512 ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context,
1516 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1519 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
1523 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1524 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1527 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
1530 if (password_hash != NULL) {
1531 struct sdb_key key = {};
1533 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
1534 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
1535 password_hash->hash,
1536 sizeof(password_hash->hash),
1542 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1543 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1546 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2SDBFlags(0);
1547 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
1548 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1549 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1550 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
1552 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1554 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
1556 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
1558 ret = samba_kdc_sort_encryption_keys(entry_ex);
1560 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1565 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1568 TALLOC_FREE(partner_realm);
1571 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1572 sdb_free_entry(entry_ex);
1574 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1581 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1582 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1584 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1585 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1588 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1590 status = dsdb_trust_search_tdo(ldb_ctx, realm, realm,
1591 attrs, mem_ctx, pmsg);
1592 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1594 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) {
1595 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1596 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1598 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
1602 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
1607 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1608 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1609 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1610 krb5_const_principal principal,
1612 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1613 struct ldb_message **msg)
1616 char *principal_string = NULL;
1618 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1619 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context,
1621 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1625 char *principal_string_m = NULL;
1626 krb5_error_code ret;
1628 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string_m);
1633 principal_string = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, principal_string_m);
1634 SAFE_FREE(principal_string_m);
1635 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1640 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1641 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1643 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1644 krb5_principal fallback_principal = NULL;
1645 unsigned int num_comp;
1646 char *fallback_realm = NULL;
1647 char *fallback_account = NULL;
1648 krb5_error_code ret;
1650 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string,
1651 &fallback_principal);
1652 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
1657 num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, fallback_principal);
1658 fallback_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(context,
1659 fallback_principal);
1660 if (fallback_realm == NULL) {
1661 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1665 if (num_comp == 1) {
1668 fallback_account = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx,
1669 context, fallback_principal, 0);
1670 if (fallback_account == NULL) {
1671 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1672 SAFE_FREE(fallback_realm);
1676 len = strlen(fallback_account);
1677 if (len >= 2 && fallback_account[len - 1] == '$') {
1678 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account);
1681 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1682 fallback_principal = NULL;
1684 if (fallback_account != NULL) {
1687 with_dollar = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s$",
1689 if (with_dollar == NULL) {
1690 SAFE_FREE(fallback_realm);
1693 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account);
1695 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1696 &fallback_principal,
1699 TALLOC_FREE(with_dollar);
1701 SAFE_FREE(fallback_realm);
1705 SAFE_FREE(fallback_realm);
1707 if (fallback_principal != NULL) {
1708 char *fallback_string = NULL;
1710 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context,
1714 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1718 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1723 SAFE_FREE(fallback_string);
1725 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1726 fallback_principal = NULL;
1728 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
1730 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1731 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1732 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1734 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1741 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1742 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1743 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1744 krb5_const_principal principal,
1746 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1747 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1748 krb5_error_code ret;
1749 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1751 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1752 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1758 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1759 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1761 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1765 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1766 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1767 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1768 krb5_const_principal principal,
1771 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1773 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1774 krb5_error_code ret;
1775 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1776 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1777 char *realm_from_princ, *realm_from_princ_malloc;
1778 char *realm_princ_comp = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 1);
1780 realm_from_princ_malloc = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1781 if (realm_from_princ_malloc == NULL) {
1783 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1785 realm_from_princ = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, realm_from_princ_malloc);
1786 free(realm_from_princ_malloc);
1787 if (realm_from_princ == NULL) {
1788 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1791 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 2
1792 || (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1794 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1797 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1799 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_from_princ)
1800 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_princ_comp)) {
1801 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1802 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1803 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1807 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1808 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
1809 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
1810 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
1811 if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1812 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1813 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1814 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1815 return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1819 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1822 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1823 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1824 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1825 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1826 "(objectClass=user)");
1828 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1829 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1830 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1831 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1832 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1834 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1835 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1838 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1839 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1840 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1841 krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1842 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1843 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1844 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1845 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1846 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1847 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1848 krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1849 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1850 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1851 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1854 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1855 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1856 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1858 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1863 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1864 const char *realm = NULL;
1866 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1868 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), realm_from_princ) == 0) {
1869 /* look for inbound trust */
1870 direction = INBOUND;
1871 realm = realm_princ_comp;
1872 } else if (principal_comp_strcasecmp(context, principal, 1, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx)) == 0) {
1873 /* look for outbound trust */
1874 direction = OUTBOUND;
1875 realm = realm_from_princ;
1877 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1880 krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1883 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1886 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1888 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1890 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1893 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1894 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1898 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1899 principal, direction,
1900 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
1902 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1903 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1904 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
1905 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1906 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1913 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1914 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1915 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1916 krb5_const_principal principal,
1919 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1920 struct ldb_message **msg)
1922 krb5_error_code ret;
1923 if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL)
1924 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) >= 2) {
1925 /* 'normal server' case */
1928 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1929 char *principal_string;
1931 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1932 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1938 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1939 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1940 * referral instead */
1941 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1942 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1943 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1944 free(principal_string);
1946 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1947 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1950 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1952 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1954 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1956 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1957 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1960 } else if (!(flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)
1961 && smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1963 * The behaviour of accepting an
1964 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
1965 * containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
1966 * not AS-REQ packets.
1968 return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1969 mem_ctx, principal, attrs,
1974 * - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
1975 * samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
1976 * matter if the name is an
1977 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
1978 * - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
1979 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
1980 * only lookup samAccountName based names.
1984 krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
1985 krb5_const_principal used_principal = NULL;
1988 char *filter = NULL;
1990 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1992 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1993 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 1) {
1994 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1995 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
1996 "enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1997 krb5_princ_size(context, principal));
2000 str = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 0);
2002 return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
2004 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, str,
2005 &enterprise_principal);
2010 used_principal = enterprise_principal;
2012 used_principal = principal;
2015 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
2016 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
2018 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
2020 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, used_principal,
2021 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM |
2022 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
2024 used_principal = NULL;
2025 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
2026 enterprise_principal = NULL;
2029 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
2030 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
2034 name1 = ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ);
2035 SAFE_FREE(short_princ);
2036 if (name1 == NULL) {
2039 len1 = strlen(name1);
2040 if (len1 >= 1 && name1[len1 - 1] != '$') {
2041 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
2042 "(&(objectClass=user)(|(samAccountName=%s)(samAccountName=%s$)))",
2044 if (filter == NULL) {
2048 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
2049 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
2051 if (filter == NULL) {
2056 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
2057 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
2059 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2061 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
2062 DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find an entry for %s filter:%s\n",
2064 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2066 if (lret == LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) {
2067 DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find unique entry for %s filter:%s\n",
2069 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2071 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2072 DEBUG(0, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
2073 name1, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2074 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2078 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2083 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
2084 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2085 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
2086 krb5_const_principal principal,
2088 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
2090 krb5_error_code ret;
2091 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2092 struct ldb_message *msg;
2094 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
2095 flags, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
2100 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2101 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
2103 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
2105 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
2111 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_realm(krb5_context context,
2112 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2113 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
2114 krb5_const_principal principal,
2116 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
2118 TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
2120 krb5_error_code ret;
2121 char *_realm = NULL;
2122 bool check_realm = false;
2123 const char *realm = NULL;
2124 struct dsdb_trust_routing_table *trt = NULL;
2125 const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
2126 unsigned int num_comp;
2130 num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, principal);
2132 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
2133 if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) {
2137 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
2138 if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ) {
2148 _realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
2149 if (_realm == NULL) {
2155 * The requested realm needs to be our own
2157 ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, _realm);
2160 * The request is not for us...
2164 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2167 realm = talloc_strdup(frame, _realm);
2169 if (realm == NULL) {
2174 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
2175 char *principal_string = NULL;
2176 krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
2177 char *enterprise_realm = NULL;
2179 if (num_comp != 1) {
2181 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2184 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame, context,
2186 if (principal_string == NULL) {
2191 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string,
2192 &enterprise_principal);
2193 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
2199 enterprise_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(context,
2200 enterprise_principal);
2201 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
2202 if (enterprise_realm != NULL) {
2203 realm = talloc_strdup(frame, enterprise_realm);
2204 SAFE_FREE(enterprise_realm);
2205 if (realm == NULL) {
2212 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
2213 char *service_realm = NULL;
2215 ret = principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME);
2218 * we need to search krbtgt/ locally
2225 * We need to check the last component against the routing table.
2227 * Note this works only with 2 or 3 component principals, e.g:
2229 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base
2230 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/bla.base
2231 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/ForestDnsZones.bla.base
2232 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/DomainDnsZones.bla.base
2235 if (num_comp == 2 || num_comp == 3) {
2236 service_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame,
2242 if (service_realm != NULL) {
2243 realm = service_realm;
2247 ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm);
2250 * skip the expensive routing lookup
2256 status = dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
2258 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
2263 tdo = dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt, realm);
2266 * This principal has to be local
2272 if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST) {
2274 * TODO: handle the routing within the forest
2276 * This should likely be handled in
2277 * samba_kdc_message2entry() in case we're
2278 * a global catalog. We'd need to check
2279 * if realm_dn is our own domain and derive
2280 * the dns domain name from realm_dn and check that
2281 * against the routing table or fallback to
2282 * the tdo we found here.
2284 * But for now we don't support multiple domains
2285 * in our forest correctly anyway.
2287 * Just search in our local database.
2293 ZERO_STRUCT(entry_ex->entry);
2295 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal,
2296 &entry_ex->entry.principal);
2302 upper = strupper_talloc(frame, tdo->domain_name.string);
2303 if (upper == NULL) {
2308 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context,
2309 entry_ex->entry.principal,
2317 return SDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
2320 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
2321 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2322 krb5_const_principal principal,
2325 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
2327 krb5_error_code ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2328 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
2330 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
2333 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
2337 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_realm(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2338 principal, flags, entry_ex);
2343 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2345 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
2346 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
2347 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2349 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
2350 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
2351 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
2352 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2354 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
2355 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
2356 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2358 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
2359 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
2360 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2364 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2368 struct samba_kdc_seq {
2371 struct ldb_message **msgs;
2372 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2375 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
2376 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2377 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry)
2379 krb5_error_code ret;
2380 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
2381 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
2382 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
2383 const char *sAMAccountName = NULL;
2384 krb5_principal principal = NULL;
2385 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
2388 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2391 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
2395 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
2399 while (priv->index < priv->count) {
2400 msg = priv->msgs[priv->index++];
2402 sAMAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "sAMAccountName", NULL);
2403 if (sAMAccountName != NULL) {
2408 if (sAMAccountName == NULL) {
2409 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2413 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &principal,
2414 realm, sAMAccountName, NULL);
2419 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2420 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
2421 SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|SDB_F_GET_ANY,
2422 priv->realm_dn, msg, entry);
2425 if (principal != NULL) {
2426 krb5_free_principal(context, principal);
2431 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
2433 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2439 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
2440 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2441 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry)
2443 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
2444 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
2446 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
2447 krb5_error_code ret;
2448 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
2453 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
2456 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
2459 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
2465 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
2468 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
2472 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
2476 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
2481 krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
2483 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
2484 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
2485 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2486 "(objectClass=user)");
2488 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2490 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2493 priv->count = res->count;
2494 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
2497 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
2499 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
2503 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
2505 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2510 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
2511 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2512 struct sdb_entry_ex *entry)
2514 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
2517 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
2519 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
2522 samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
2523 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2524 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
2525 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
2527 krb5_error_code ret;
2528 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2529 struct ldb_message *msg;
2530 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
2531 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
2532 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
2536 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
2540 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
2544 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
2545 SDB_F_GET_CLIENT|SDB_F_GET_SERVER,
2546 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
2549 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2553 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, skdc_entry->msg, "objectSid");
2554 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
2556 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
2557 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
2559 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
2560 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2561 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2564 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2568 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
2569 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
2570 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
2574 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
2575 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2576 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
2577 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
2579 krb5_error_code ret;
2580 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2581 struct ldb_message *msg;
2582 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
2583 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
2584 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
2588 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
2592 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
2596 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
2597 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
2598 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
2601 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2605 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, skdc_entry->msg, "objectSid");
2606 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
2608 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
2609 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
2611 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
2612 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2613 #ifdef KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH /* Heimdal */
2614 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
2615 #elif defined(KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH) /* MIT */
2616 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
2620 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2625 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
2629 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
2630 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2631 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
2632 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
2634 krb5_error_code ret;
2636 const char *client_dn = NULL;
2637 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
2638 struct ldb_message_element *el;
2643 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
2647 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2648 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2649 " talloc_named() failed!");
2653 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(skdc_entry->msg->dn);
2659 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2660 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2661 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
2666 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
2667 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
2669 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
2670 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
2673 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
2674 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
2676 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2677 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2678 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2679 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
2682 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
2685 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
2687 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
2689 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2690 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2691 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
2695 el = ldb_msg_find_element(skdc_entry->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
2700 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
2702 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
2703 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
2704 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
2707 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
2711 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
2712 (const char *)val2->data,
2726 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
2728 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2732 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2733 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
2734 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
2736 target_principal_name);
2737 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2738 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2741 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
2742 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
2745 struct ldb_message *msg;
2746 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
2747 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
2748 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
2749 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
2752 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
2753 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
2756 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
2757 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
2758 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
2760 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
2761 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
2762 kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx = base_ctx->msg_ctx;
2764 /* get default kdc policy */
2765 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(mem_ctx,
2767 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
2768 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
2769 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
2771 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
2772 if (session_info == NULL) {
2773 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2776 /* Setup the link to LDB */
2777 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
2778 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
2779 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
2780 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
2781 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2782 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2785 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
2786 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
2787 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2788 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
2789 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2790 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2791 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2793 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
2794 int my_krbtgt_number;
2795 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
2796 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
2797 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
2799 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
2800 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2801 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2802 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2805 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
2806 "serverReference", &account_dn);
2807 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2808 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2809 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2810 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2811 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2814 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
2815 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
2816 talloc_free(account_dn);
2817 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2818 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2819 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2820 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2821 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2824 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2825 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
2827 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2828 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
2829 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2830 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
2831 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2832 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2833 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
2834 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2835 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2837 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
2838 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
2839 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
2840 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2842 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2843 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2845 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
2848 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2849 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2851 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2854 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2855 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
2857 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2858 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2859 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2860 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2862 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
2863 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2866 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
2867 return NT_STATUS_OK;