2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
27 #include "auth/auth.h"
28 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
29 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
30 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
31 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
32 #include "param/param.h"
33 #include "param/secrets.h"
34 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
35 #include "system/kerberos.h"
36 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
38 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
39 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
40 #include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
41 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h"
42 #include "lib/messaging/irpc.h"
47 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
48 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
50 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(kvno) \
51 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF))
53 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
54 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
55 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
57 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
58 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
59 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
61 enum trust_direction {
63 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
64 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
67 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
74 "msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo",
78 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
83 send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a
84 REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets
86 static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
87 struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
88 struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
89 struct ldb_dn *user_dn)
91 struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle;
92 struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r;
93 struct tevent_req *req;
96 tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
97 if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
101 irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx,
104 if (irpc_handle == NULL) {
105 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n"));
106 TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
110 r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn);
113 * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation,
114 * which delivers the message in the _send function.
116 * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register
117 * a callback and wait for it to be triggered!
119 req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx,
124 /* we aren't interested in a reply */
126 TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
129 static time_t ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, time_t default_val)
135 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
139 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
147 static struct SDBFlags uf2SDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
149 struct SDBFlags flags = int2SDBFlags(0);
151 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
154 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
159 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
162 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
163 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
164 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
170 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
171 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
176 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
177 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
182 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
183 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
189 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
190 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
193 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
194 flags.locked_out = 1;
197 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
202 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
204 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
208 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
211 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
215 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
216 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
218 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
219 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
221 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
223 * this is confusing...
225 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
230 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
231 * => trusted_for_delegation
233 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
235 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
236 flags.forwardable = 1;
240 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
241 flags.require_preauth = 0;
243 flags.require_preauth = 1;
246 if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
247 flags.no_auth_data_reqd = 1;
253 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
255 if (p->db_entry != NULL) {
257 * A sdb_entry still has a reference
262 if (p->kdc_entry != NULL) {
264 * hdb_entry or krb5_db_entry still
265 * have a reference...
274 * Sort keys in descending order of strength.
276 * Explanaton from Greg Hudson:
278 * To encrypt tickets only the first returned key is used by the MIT KDC. The
279 * other keys just communicate support for session key enctypes, and aren't
280 * really used. The encryption key for the ticket enc part doesn't have
281 * to be of a type requested by the client. The session key enctype is chosen
282 * based on the client preference order, limited by the set of enctypes present
283 * in the server keys (unless the string attribute is set on the server
284 * principal overriding that set).
287 static int sdb_key_strength_priority(krb5_enctype etype)
289 static const krb5_enctype etype_list[] = {
290 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
291 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
292 ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
293 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
301 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list); i++) {
302 if (etype == etype_list[i]) {
307 return ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list) - i;
310 static int sdb_key_strength_cmp(const struct sdb_key *k1, const struct sdb_key *k2)
312 int p1 = sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k1->key));
313 int p2 = sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k2->key));
321 * Higher priority comes first
329 static void samba_kdc_sort_keys(struct sdb_keys *keys)
335 TYPESAFE_QSORT(keys->val, keys->len, sdb_key_strength_cmp);
338 int samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(krb5_context context,
339 const struct ldb_val *secretbuffer,
340 uint32_t supported_enctypes,
341 struct sdb_keys *keys)
343 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
348 keys->val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
349 if (keys->val == NULL) {
350 memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
355 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
356 struct sdb_key key = {};
358 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
359 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
361 MIN(secretbuffer->length, 32),
364 memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
368 keys->val[keys->len] = key;
372 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
373 struct sdb_key key = {};
375 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
376 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
378 MIN(secretbuffer->length, 16),
381 memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
385 keys->val[keys->len] = key;
389 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
390 struct sdb_key key = {};
392 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
393 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
395 MIN(secretbuffer->length, 16),
398 memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
402 keys->val[keys->len] = key;
411 static int samba_kdc_set_random_keys(krb5_context context,
412 uint32_t supported_enctypes,
413 struct sdb_keys *keys)
415 struct ldb_val secret_val;
416 uint8_t secretbuffer[32];
419 * Fake keys until we have a better way to reject
420 * non-pkinit requests.
422 * We just need to indicate which encryption types are
425 generate_secret_buffer(secretbuffer, sizeof(secretbuffer));
427 secret_val = data_blob_const(secretbuffer,
428 sizeof(secretbuffer));
429 return samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(context,
435 struct samba_kdc_user_keys {
436 struct sdb_keys *skeys;
438 uint32_t *returned_kvno;
439 uint32_t supported_enctypes;
440 uint32_t *available_enctypes;
441 const struct samr_Password *nthash;
442 const char *salt_string;
444 const struct package_PrimaryKerberosKey4 *pkeys;
447 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(krb5_context context,
448 struct samba_kdc_user_keys *p)
451 * Make sure we'll never reveal DES keys
453 uint32_t supported_enctypes = p->supported_enctypes & ENC_ALL_TYPES;
454 uint32_t _available_enctypes = 0;
455 uint32_t *available_enctypes = p->available_enctypes;
456 uint32_t _returned_kvno = 0;
457 uint32_t *returned_kvno = p->returned_kvno;
458 uint32_t num_pkeys = p->num_pkeys;
459 uint32_t allocated_keys = num_pkeys;
463 if (available_enctypes == NULL) {
464 available_enctypes = &_available_enctypes;
467 *available_enctypes = 0;
469 if (returned_kvno == NULL) {
470 returned_kvno = &_returned_kvno;
473 *returned_kvno = p->kvno;
475 if (p->nthash != NULL) {
479 allocated_keys = MAX(1, allocated_keys);
481 /* allocate space to decode into */
483 p->skeys->val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
484 if (p->skeys->val == NULL) {
488 for (i=0; i < num_pkeys; i++) {
489 struct sdb_key key = {};
490 uint32_t enctype_bit;
492 if (p->pkeys[i].value == NULL) {
496 enctype_bit = kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(p->pkeys[i].keytype);
497 if (!(enctype_bit & supported_enctypes)) {
501 if (p->salt_string != NULL) {
504 salt = data_blob_string_const(p->salt_string);
506 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
507 if (key.salt == NULL) {
512 key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT;
514 ret = smb_krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt,
518 ZERO_STRUCTP(key.salt);
524 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
526 p->pkeys[i].value->data,
527 p->pkeys[i].value->length,
530 p->skeys->val[p->skeys->len++] = key;
531 *available_enctypes |= enctype_bit;
534 ZERO_STRUCT(key.key);
536 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
537 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
538 p->pkeys[i].keytype));
546 if (p->nthash != NULL && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
547 struct sdb_key key = {};
549 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
550 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
552 sizeof(p->nthash->hash),
555 p->skeys->val[p->skeys->len++] = key;
557 *available_enctypes |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
558 } else if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
559 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
560 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC));
568 samba_kdc_sort_keys(p->skeys);
572 sdb_keys_free(p->skeys);
576 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
577 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
579 const struct ldb_message *msg,
582 uint32_t userAccountControl,
583 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
585 krb5_kvno requested_kvno,
586 struct sdb_entry *entry,
588 uint32_t *supported_enctypes_out)
590 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
591 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
592 struct samr_Password *hash;
593 unsigned int num_ntPwdHistory = 0;
594 struct samr_Password *ntPwdHistory = NULL;
595 struct samr_Password *old_hash = NULL;
596 struct samr_Password *older_hash = NULL;
597 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
598 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
599 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
600 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
601 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
602 bool is_krbtgt = false;
603 int krbtgt_number = 0;
604 uint32_t current_kvno;
605 uint32_t old_kvno = 0;
606 uint32_t older_kvno = 0;
607 uint32_t returned_kvno = 0;
609 struct samba_kdc_user_keys keys = { .num_pkeys = 0, };
610 struct samba_kdc_user_keys old_keys = { .num_pkeys = 0, };
611 struct samba_kdc_user_keys older_keys = { .num_pkeys = 0, };
612 uint32_t available_enctypes = 0;
613 uint32_t supported_enctypes
614 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
615 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
617 *supported_enctypes_out = 0;
619 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
622 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
623 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
626 enable_fast = lpcfg_kdc_enable_fast(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
628 supported_enctypes |= ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED;
630 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
631 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
632 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
633 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
634 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
635 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
636 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
639 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
640 * to export into a keytab */
641 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
644 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
645 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
646 supported_enctypes = 0;
648 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
649 supported_enctypes |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
653 supported_enctypes &= ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
656 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
658 krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
660 if (krbtgt_number == -1) {
663 if (krbtgt_number == 0) {
668 if ((ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT)
669 && (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED)) {
670 ret = samba_kdc_set_random_keys(context,
674 *supported_enctypes_out = supported_enctypes;
679 current_kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
680 if (current_kvno > 1) {
681 old_kvno = current_kvno - 1;
683 if (current_kvno > 2) {
684 older_kvno = current_kvno - 2;
688 * Even for the main krbtgt account
689 * we have to strictly split the kvno into
690 * two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
691 * need to be all zero, even if
692 * the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
695 * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
697 current_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(current_kvno);
698 old_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(old_kvno);
699 older_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(older_kvno);
700 requested_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(requested_kvno);
703 /* Get keys from the db */
705 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
706 num_ntPwdHistory = samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx, msg,
709 if (num_ntPwdHistory > 1) {
710 old_hash = &ntPwdHistory[1];
712 if (num_ntPwdHistory > 2) {
713 older_hash = &ntPwdHistory[1];
715 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
717 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
719 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
720 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
721 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
722 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
727 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
728 if (scb.sub.num_packages != 0) {
729 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
735 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
736 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
737 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
738 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
747 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys element
748 * of supplementalCredentials
750 * The legacy Primary:Kerberos only contains
751 * single DES keys, which are completely ignored
757 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
763 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
764 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
765 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
766 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
768 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
769 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
773 if (_pkb.version != 4) {
775 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
776 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
780 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
783 keys = (struct samba_kdc_user_keys) {
784 .kvno = current_kvno,
785 .supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes,
787 .salt_string = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->salt.string : NULL,
788 .num_pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->num_keys : 0,
789 .pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->keys : NULL,
792 old_keys = (struct samba_kdc_user_keys) {
794 .supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes,
796 .salt_string = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->salt.string : NULL,
797 .num_pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->num_old_keys : 0,
798 .pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->old_keys : NULL,
800 older_keys = (struct samba_kdc_user_keys) {
802 .supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes,
803 .nthash = older_hash,
804 .salt_string = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->salt.string : NULL,
805 .num_pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->num_older_keys : 0,
806 .pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->older_keys : NULL,
809 if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
810 if (requested_kvno == keys.kvno) {
812 * The current kvno was requested,
815 keys.skeys = &entry->keys;
816 keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes;
817 keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno;
818 } else if (requested_kvno == 0) {
820 * don't return any keys
822 } else if (requested_kvno == old_keys.kvno) {
824 * return the old keys as default keys
825 * with the requested kvno.
827 old_keys.skeys = &entry->keys;
828 old_keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes;
829 old_keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno;
830 } else if (requested_kvno == older_keys.kvno) {
832 * return the older keys as default keys
833 * with the requested kvno.
835 older_keys.skeys = &entry->keys;
836 older_keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes;
837 older_keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno;
840 * don't return any keys
844 bool include_history = false;
846 if ((flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)) {
847 include_history = true;
848 } else if (flags & SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
849 include_history = true;
852 keys.skeys = &entry->keys;
853 keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes;
854 keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno;
856 if (include_history && old_keys.kvno != 0) {
857 old_keys.skeys = &entry->old_keys;
859 if (include_history && older_keys.kvno != 0) {
860 older_keys.skeys = &entry->older_keys;
864 if (keys.skeys != NULL) {
865 ret = samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context, &keys);
871 if (old_keys.skeys != NULL) {
872 ret = samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context, &old_keys);
878 if (older_keys.skeys != NULL) {
879 ret = samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context, &older_keys);
885 *supported_enctypes_out |= available_enctypes;
887 /* Set FAST support bits */
888 *supported_enctypes_out |= supported_enctypes & (ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED |
889 ENC_COMPOUND_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED |
890 ENC_CLAIMS_SUPPORTED);
894 * Even for the main krbtgt account
895 * we have to strictly split the kvno into
896 * two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
897 * need to be all zero, even if
898 * the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
901 * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
903 returned_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(returned_kvno, krbtgt_number);
905 entry->kvno = returned_kvno;
907 if (entry->keys.len == 0) {
908 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
909 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
910 auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(kdc_db_ctx, kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx,
911 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx, msg->dn);
912 return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
916 * oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
917 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
918 * allows an entry with no keys (yet).
926 static int principal_comp_strcmp_int(krb5_context context,
927 krb5_const_principal principal,
928 unsigned int component,
935 #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_COMP_STRING)
936 p = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, component);
943 if (component >= krb5_princ_size(context, principal)) {
947 d = krb5_princ_component(context, principal, component);
956 return strncasecmp(p, string, len);
958 return strncmp(p, string, len);
962 static int principal_comp_strcasecmp(krb5_context context,
963 krb5_const_principal principal,
964 unsigned int component,
967 return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal,
968 component, string, true);
971 static int principal_comp_strcmp(krb5_context context,
972 krb5_const_principal principal,
973 unsigned int component,
976 return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal,
977 component, string, false);
981 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
983 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
984 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
986 krb5_const_principal principal,
987 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
990 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
991 struct ldb_message *msg,
992 struct sdb_entry *entry)
994 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
995 uint32_t userAccountControl;
996 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
997 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
998 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
999 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
1000 uint32_t supported_enctypes = 0;
1003 bool protected_user = false;
1005 bool is_rodc = false;
1006 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
1007 struct ldb_val computer_val = data_blob_string_const("computer");
1008 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
1010 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry);
1012 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
1016 if (!samAccountName) {
1018 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
1022 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
1024 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
1028 p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1034 p->is_rodc = is_rodc;
1035 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
1036 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
1042 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
1044 entry->skdc_entry = p;
1046 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
1048 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
1049 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
1050 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
1054 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
1055 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
1056 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
1057 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
1059 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
1061 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
1062 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
1065 userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
1069 * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
1070 * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
1073 * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
1074 * get back the whole principal as-sent
1076 * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
1077 * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
1080 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
1081 p->is_krbtgt = true;
1083 if (flags & (SDB_F_CANON|SDB_F_FORCE_CANON)) {
1085 * When requested to do so, ensure that the
1086 * both realm values in the principal are set
1087 * to the upper case, canonical realm
1089 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->principal,
1090 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "krbtgt",
1091 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), NULL);
1093 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1096 smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry->principal, KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
1098 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry->principal);
1100 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1104 * this appears to be required regardless of
1105 * the canonicalize flag from the client
1107 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry->principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1109 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1114 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
1115 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
1117 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1120 } else if ((flags & SDB_F_FORCE_CANON) ||
1121 ((flags & SDB_F_CANON) && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ))) {
1123 * SDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
1124 * packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
1125 * and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the AS-REQ case
1127 * The SDB_F_FORCE_CANON if for new MIT KDC code that wants
1128 * the canonical name in all lookups, and takes care to
1129 * canonicalize only when appropriate.
1131 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
1133 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1137 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry->principal);
1139 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1143 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
1144 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
1145 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
1146 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
1147 * we determine from our records */
1149 /* this has to be with malloc() */
1150 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry->principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1152 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1157 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
1158 entry->flags = uf2SDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
1161 * Take control of the returned principal here, rather than
1162 * allowing the Heimdal code to do it as we have specific
1163 * behaviour around the forced realm to honour
1165 entry->flags.force_canonicalize = true;
1167 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
1168 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
1169 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
1170 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
1172 if (entry->flags.server
1173 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
1174 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
1175 entry->flags.server = 0;
1180 * We restrict a 3-part SPN ending in my domain/realm to full
1181 * domain controllers.
1183 * This avoids any cases where (eg) a demoted DC still has
1184 * these more restricted SPNs.
1186 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > 2) {
1188 = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx,
1193 lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx,
1195 bool is_dc = userAccountControl &
1196 (UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT);
1197 if (is_our_realm && !is_dc) {
1198 entry->flags.server = 0;
1202 * To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
1203 * not just return the entry without .server set, we must
1204 * pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
1205 * return ERR_POLICY instead of
1206 * KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
1208 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && entry->flags.server == 0) {
1209 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1210 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
1213 if (flags & SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
1214 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
1215 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
1216 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
1219 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1220 entry->created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
1221 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1223 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1224 &entry->created_by.principal,
1225 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
1227 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1231 entry->modified_by = (struct sdb_event *) malloc(sizeof(struct sdb_event));
1232 if (entry->modified_by == NULL) {
1234 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
1238 /* use 'whenChanged' */
1239 entry->modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
1240 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1241 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1242 &entry->modified_by->principal,
1243 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
1245 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1251 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
1252 * virtue of being that particular RID */
1253 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
1255 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1260 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
1263 entry->valid_end = NULL;
1264 entry->pw_end = NULL;
1266 entry->flags.invalid = 0;
1267 entry->flags.server = 1;
1269 realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
1270 mem_ctx, context, principal);
1271 if (realm == NULL) {
1276 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
1277 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
1278 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
1279 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
1280 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
1281 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) == 2
1282 && (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, "kadmin") == 0)
1283 && (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 1, "changepw") == 0)
1284 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm)) {
1285 entry->flags.change_pw = 1;
1290 entry->flags.client = 0;
1291 entry->flags.forwardable = 1;
1292 entry->flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
1293 } else if (is_rodc) {
1294 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
1295 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
1298 entry->valid_end = NULL;
1299 entry->pw_end = NULL;
1301 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
1302 entry->flags.client = 0;
1303 entry->flags.invalid = 0;
1304 entry->flags.server = 1;
1306 entry->flags.client = 0;
1307 entry->flags.forwardable = 1;
1308 entry->flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
1309 } else if (entry->flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
1310 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
1311 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
1313 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
1314 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
1315 entry->flags.client = 0;
1317 entry->valid_end = NULL;
1318 entry->pw_end = NULL;
1321 NTTIME must_change_time
1322 = samdb_result_nttime(msg,
1323 "msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed",
1325 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
1326 entry->pw_end = NULL;
1328 entry->pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry->pw_end));
1329 if (entry->pw_end == NULL) {
1333 *entry->pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
1336 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
1337 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
1338 entry->valid_end = NULL;
1340 entry->valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry->valid_end));
1341 if (entry->valid_end == NULL) {
1345 *entry->valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
1349 entry->valid_start = NULL;
1351 entry->max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry->max_life));
1352 if (entry->max_life == NULL) {
1357 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
1358 *entry->max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
1359 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
1360 *entry->max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
1362 *entry->max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
1363 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
1366 entry->max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry->max_renew));
1367 if (entry->max_renew == NULL) {
1372 *entry->max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
1374 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)) {
1376 struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL;
1378 * These protections only apply to clients, so servers in the
1379 * Protected Users group may still have service tickets to them
1380 * encrypted with RC4. For accounts looked up as servers, note
1381 * that 'msg' does not contain the 'memberOf' attribute for
1382 * determining whether the account is a member of Protected
1385 * Additionally, Microsoft advises that accounts for services
1386 * and computers should never be members of Protected Users, or
1387 * they may fail to authenticate.
1389 status = samba_kdc_get_user_info_from_db(p, msg, &user_info_dc);
1390 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1395 result = dsdb_is_protected_user(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1397 user_info_dc->num_sids);
1403 protected_user = result;
1405 if (protected_user) {
1406 *entry->max_life = MIN(*entry->max_life, 4 * 60 * 60);
1407 *entry->max_renew = MIN(*entry->max_renew, 4 * 60 * 60);
1409 entry->flags.forwardable = 0;
1410 entry->flags.proxiable = 0;
1414 /* Get keys from the db */
1415 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
1416 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
1417 ent_type, flags, kvno, entry,
1418 protected_user, &supported_enctypes);
1420 /* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */
1424 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1425 p->supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes;
1429 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1430 sdb_entry_free(entry);
1432 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, p);
1439 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
1440 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
1442 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
1443 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1444 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1445 enum trust_direction direction,
1446 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1449 struct ldb_message *msg,
1450 struct sdb_entry *entry)
1452 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1453 const char *our_realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
1454 char *partner_realm = NULL;
1455 const char *realm = NULL;
1456 const char *krbtgt_realm = NULL;
1457 DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
1458 DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
1459 struct samr_Password _password_hash;
1460 const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
1461 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
1462 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
1463 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
1464 bool use_previous = false;
1465 uint32_t current_kvno;
1466 uint32_t previous_kvno;
1467 uint32_t num_keys = 0;
1468 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
1471 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
1474 uint32_t *auth_kvno;
1475 bool preferr_current = false;
1476 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
1477 struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
1480 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry);
1482 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
1483 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
1484 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
1485 supported_enctypes);
1488 status = dsdb_trust_parse_tdo_info(mem_ctx, msg, &tdo);
1489 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1490 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1495 if (!(tdo->trust_direction & direction)) {
1496 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1497 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1501 if (tdo->trust_type != LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL) {
1503 * Only UPLEVEL domains support kerberos here,
1504 * as we don't support LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT.
1506 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1507 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1511 if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION) {
1513 * We don't support selective authentication yet.
1515 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1516 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1520 if (tdo->domain_name.string == NULL) {
1521 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1522 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1525 partner_realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, tdo->domain_name.string);
1526 if (partner_realm == NULL) {
1527 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1532 if (direction == INBOUND) {
1534 krbtgt_realm = partner_realm;
1536 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
1537 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
1538 realm = partner_realm;
1539 krbtgt_realm = our_realm;
1541 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
1544 if (password_val == NULL) {
1545 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1546 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1550 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
1551 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
1552 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
1553 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1558 p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1565 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
1566 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
1567 p->supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes;
1569 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
1571 entry->skdc_entry = p;
1573 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1574 entry->created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
1575 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1576 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1577 &entry->created_by.principal,
1578 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
1580 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1585 * We always need to generate the canonicalized principal
1586 * with the values of our database.
1588 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->principal, realm,
1589 "krbtgt", krbtgt_realm, NULL);
1591 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1594 smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry->principal,
1597 entry->valid_start = NULL;
1599 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
1600 * the previous password hash.
1601 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
1602 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
1603 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
1604 * then we use the previous substrucure.
1608 * Windows preferrs the previous key for one hour.
1610 tv = timeval_current();
1611 if (tv.tv_sec > 3600) {
1614 an_hour_ago = timeval_to_nttime(&tv);
1616 /* first work out the current kvno */
1618 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
1619 struct AuthenticationInformation *a =
1620 &password_blob.current.array[i];
1622 if (a->LastUpdateTime <= an_hour_ago) {
1623 preferr_current = true;
1626 if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
1627 current_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version;
1630 if (current_kvno == 0) {
1631 previous_kvno = 255;
1633 previous_kvno = current_kvno - 1;
1635 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
1636 struct AuthenticationInformation *a =
1637 &password_blob.previous.array[i];
1639 if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
1640 previous_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version;
1644 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
1646 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
1647 /* there is no previous password */
1648 use_previous = false;
1649 } else if (!(flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED)) {
1651 * If not specified we use the lowest kvno
1652 * for the first hour after an update.
1654 if (preferr_current) {
1655 use_previous = false;
1656 } else if (previous_kvno < current_kvno) {
1657 use_previous = true;
1659 use_previous = false;
1661 } else if (kvno == current_kvno) {
1665 use_previous = false;
1666 } else if (kvno == previous_kvno) {
1670 use_previous = true;
1673 * Fallback to the current one for anything else
1675 use_previous = false;
1679 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
1680 auth_kvno = &previous_kvno;
1682 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
1683 auth_kvno = ¤t_kvno;
1686 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
1687 if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1690 entry->kvno = *auth_kvno;
1693 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
1694 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
1697 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
1698 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
1699 if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
1703 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1704 mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
1705 if (password_hash == NULL) {
1708 password_hash = &_password_hash;
1711 if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
1715 ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
1716 CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
1717 password_utf16.data,
1718 password_utf16.length,
1719 (void *)&password_utf8.data,
1720 &password_utf8.length);
1722 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1727 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1730 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1734 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
1735 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1736 password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
1742 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
1743 if (num_keys == 0) {
1744 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
1745 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1746 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1750 entry->keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
1751 if (entry->keys.val == NULL) {
1752 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1757 if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
1758 struct sdb_key key = {};
1759 krb5_const_principal salt_principal = entry->principal;
1761 krb5_data cleartext_data;
1763 cleartext_data.data = discard_const_p(char, password_utf8.data);
1764 cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
1766 ret = smb_krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
1773 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1774 ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context,
1778 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1781 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
1785 entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key;
1789 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1790 ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context,
1794 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1797 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
1801 entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key;
1805 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
1808 if (password_hash != NULL) {
1809 struct sdb_key key = {};
1811 ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
1812 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
1813 password_hash->hash,
1814 sizeof(password_hash->hash),
1820 entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key;
1824 entry->flags = int2SDBFlags(0);
1825 entry->flags.immutable = 1;
1826 entry->flags.invalid = 0;
1827 entry->flags.server = 1;
1828 entry->flags.require_preauth = 1;
1830 entry->pw_end = NULL;
1832 entry->max_life = NULL;
1834 entry->max_renew = NULL;
1836 /* Match Windows behavior and allow forwardable flag in cross-realm. */
1837 entry->flags.forwardable = 1;
1839 samba_kdc_sort_keys(&entry->keys);
1841 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1844 TALLOC_FREE(partner_realm);
1847 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1848 sdb_entry_free(entry);
1850 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, p);
1857 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1858 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1860 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1861 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1864 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1866 status = dsdb_trust_search_tdo(ldb_ctx, realm, realm,
1867 attrs, mem_ctx, pmsg);
1868 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1870 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) {
1871 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1872 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1874 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
1878 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
1883 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1884 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1885 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1886 krb5_const_principal principal,
1888 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1889 struct ldb_message **msg)
1892 char *principal_string = NULL;
1894 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1895 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context,
1897 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1901 char *principal_string_m = NULL;
1902 krb5_error_code ret;
1904 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string_m);
1909 principal_string = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, principal_string_m);
1910 SAFE_FREE(principal_string_m);
1911 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1916 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1917 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1919 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1920 krb5_principal fallback_principal = NULL;
1921 unsigned int num_comp;
1922 char *fallback_realm = NULL;
1923 char *fallback_account = NULL;
1924 krb5_error_code ret;
1926 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string,
1927 &fallback_principal);
1928 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
1933 num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, fallback_principal);
1934 fallback_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
1935 mem_ctx, context, fallback_principal);
1936 if (fallback_realm == NULL) {
1937 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1941 if (num_comp == 1) {
1944 fallback_account = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx,
1945 context, fallback_principal, 0);
1946 if (fallback_account == NULL) {
1947 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1948 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
1952 len = strlen(fallback_account);
1953 if (len >= 2 && fallback_account[len - 1] == '$') {
1954 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account);
1957 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1958 fallback_principal = NULL;
1960 if (fallback_account != NULL) {
1963 with_dollar = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s$",
1965 if (with_dollar == NULL) {
1966 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
1969 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account);
1971 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
1972 &fallback_principal,
1975 TALLOC_FREE(with_dollar);
1977 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
1981 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
1983 if (fallback_principal != NULL) {
1984 char *fallback_string = NULL;
1986 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context,
1990 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
1994 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1999 SAFE_FREE(fallback_string);
2001 krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
2002 fallback_principal = NULL;
2004 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
2006 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
2007 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2008 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
2010 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
2017 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
2018 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2019 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
2020 krb5_const_principal principal,
2023 struct sdb_entry *entry)
2025 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2026 krb5_error_code ret;
2027 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
2029 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
2030 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
2036 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2037 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
2039 realm_dn, msg, entry);
2043 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
2044 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2045 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
2046 krb5_const_principal principal,
2049 struct sdb_entry *entry)
2051 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
2052 krb5_error_code ret;
2053 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
2054 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
2055 char *realm_from_princ;
2056 char *realm_princ_comp = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 1);
2058 realm_from_princ = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
2059 mem_ctx, context, principal);
2060 if (realm_from_princ == NULL) {
2062 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2065 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 2
2066 || (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
2068 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2071 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
2073 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_from_princ)
2074 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_princ_comp)) {
2075 /* us, or someone quite like us */
2076 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
2077 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
2081 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
2082 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
2083 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
2084 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
2085 if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
2086 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
2087 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
2088 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
2089 return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
2093 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
2096 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
2097 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
2098 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
2099 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2100 "(objectClass=user)");
2102 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
2103 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
2104 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
2105 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
2106 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
2108 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2109 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
2112 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
2113 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2114 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
2115 krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
2116 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2117 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
2118 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2119 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2120 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2121 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
2122 krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
2123 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2124 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
2125 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2128 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2129 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
2130 flags, kvno, realm_dn, msg, entry);
2132 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
2137 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
2138 const char *realm = NULL;
2140 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
2142 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), realm_from_princ) == 0) {
2143 /* look for inbound trust */
2144 direction = INBOUND;
2145 realm = realm_princ_comp;
2146 } else if (principal_comp_strcasecmp(context, principal, 1, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx)) == 0) {
2147 /* look for outbound trust */
2148 direction = OUTBOUND;
2149 realm = realm_from_princ;
2151 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
2154 krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
2157 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2160 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
2162 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
2164 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
2167 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
2168 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
2172 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2174 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry);
2176 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
2177 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
2178 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
2179 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
2180 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
2187 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
2188 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2189 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
2190 krb5_const_principal principal,
2193 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
2194 struct ldb_message **msg)
2196 krb5_error_code ret;
2197 if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL)
2198 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) >= 2) {
2199 /* 'normal server' case */
2202 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
2203 char *principal_string;
2205 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
2206 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
2212 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
2213 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
2214 * referral instead */
2215 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
2216 mem_ctx, principal_string,
2217 &user_dn, realm_dn);
2218 free(principal_string);
2220 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
2221 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2224 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
2226 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
2228 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2230 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2231 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2234 } else if (!(flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)
2235 && smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
2237 * The behaviour of accepting an
2238 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
2239 * containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
2240 * not AS-REQ packets.
2242 return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
2243 mem_ctx, principal, attrs,
2248 * - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
2249 * samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
2250 * matter if the name is an
2251 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
2252 * - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
2253 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
2254 * only lookup samAccountName based names.
2258 krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
2259 krb5_const_principal used_principal = NULL;
2262 char *filter = NULL;
2264 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
2266 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
2267 if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 1) {
2268 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
2269 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
2270 "enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
2271 krb5_princ_size(context, principal));
2274 str = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 0);
2276 return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
2278 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, str,
2279 &enterprise_principal);
2284 used_principal = enterprise_principal;
2286 used_principal = principal;
2289 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
2290 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
2292 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
2294 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, used_principal,
2295 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM |
2296 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
2298 used_principal = NULL;
2299 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
2300 enterprise_principal = NULL;
2303 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
2304 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
2308 name1 = ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ);
2309 SAFE_FREE(short_princ);
2310 if (name1 == NULL) {
2313 len1 = strlen(name1);
2314 if (len1 >= 1 && name1[len1 - 1] != '$') {
2315 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
2316 "(&(objectClass=user)(|(samAccountName=%s)(samAccountName=%s$)))",
2318 if (filter == NULL) {
2322 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
2323 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
2325 if (filter == NULL) {
2330 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
2331 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
2333 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2335 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
2336 DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find an entry for %s filter:%s\n",
2338 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2340 if (lret == LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) {
2341 DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find unique entry for %s filter:%s\n",
2343 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2345 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2346 DEBUG(0, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
2347 name1, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2348 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2352 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2357 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
2358 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2359 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
2360 krb5_const_principal principal,
2363 struct sdb_entry *entry)
2365 krb5_error_code ret;
2366 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2367 struct ldb_message *msg;
2369 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
2370 flags, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
2375 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2376 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
2378 realm_dn, msg, entry);
2380 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
2386 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_realm(krb5_context context,
2387 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2388 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
2389 krb5_const_principal principal,
2391 struct sdb_entry *entry)
2393 TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
2395 krb5_error_code ret;
2396 bool check_realm = false;
2397 const char *realm = NULL;
2398 struct dsdb_trust_routing_table *trt = NULL;
2399 const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
2400 unsigned int num_comp;
2404 num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, principal);
2406 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
2407 if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) {
2411 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
2412 if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ) {
2422 realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(frame, context, principal);
2423 if (realm == NULL) {
2429 * The requested realm needs to be our own
2431 ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm);
2434 * The request is not for us...
2437 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2440 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
2441 char *principal_string = NULL;
2442 krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
2443 char *enterprise_realm = NULL;
2445 if (num_comp != 1) {
2447 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2450 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame, context,
2452 if (principal_string == NULL) {
2457 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string,
2458 &enterprise_principal);
2459 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
2465 enterprise_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
2466 frame, context, enterprise_principal);
2467 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
2468 if (enterprise_realm != NULL) {
2469 realm = enterprise_realm;
2473 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
2474 char *service_realm = NULL;
2476 ret = principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME);
2479 * we need to search krbtgt/ locally
2486 * We need to check the last component against the routing table.
2488 * Note this works only with 2 or 3 component principals, e.g:
2490 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base
2491 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/bla.base
2492 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/ForestDnsZones.bla.base
2493 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/DomainDnsZones.bla.base
2496 if (num_comp == 2 || num_comp == 3) {
2497 service_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame,
2503 if (service_realm != NULL) {
2504 realm = service_realm;
2508 ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm);
2511 * skip the expensive routing lookup
2517 status = dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
2519 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
2524 tdo = dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt, realm);
2527 * This principal has to be local
2533 if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST) {
2535 * TODO: handle the routing within the forest
2537 * This should likely be handled in
2538 * samba_kdc_message2entry() in case we're
2539 * a global catalog. We'd need to check
2540 * if realm_dn is our own domain and derive
2541 * the dns domain name from realm_dn and check that
2542 * against the routing table or fallback to
2543 * the tdo we found here.
2545 * But for now we don't support multiple domains
2546 * in our forest correctly anyway.
2548 * Just search in our local database.
2554 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry);
2556 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal,
2563 upper = strupper_talloc(frame, tdo->domain_name.string);
2564 if (upper == NULL) {
2569 ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context,
2578 return SDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
2581 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
2582 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2583 krb5_const_principal principal,
2586 struct sdb_entry *entry)
2588 krb5_error_code ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2589 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
2591 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
2594 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
2598 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_realm(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2599 principal, flags, entry);
2604 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2606 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
2607 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry);
2608 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2610 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
2611 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
2612 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry);
2613 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2615 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
2616 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry);
2617 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2619 if (flags & SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
2620 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry);
2621 if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
2625 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2629 struct samba_kdc_seq {
2632 struct ldb_message **msgs;
2633 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2636 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
2637 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2638 struct sdb_entry *entry)
2640 krb5_error_code ret;
2641 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
2642 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
2643 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
2644 const char *sAMAccountName = NULL;
2645 krb5_principal principal = NULL;
2646 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
2649 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2652 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
2656 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
2660 while (priv->index < priv->count) {
2661 msg = priv->msgs[priv->index++];
2663 sAMAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "sAMAccountName", NULL);
2664 if (sAMAccountName != NULL) {
2669 if (sAMAccountName == NULL) {
2670 ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2674 ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &principal,
2675 realm, sAMAccountName, NULL);
2680 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
2681 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
2682 SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|SDB_F_GET_ANY,
2684 priv->realm_dn, msg, entry);
2687 if (principal != NULL) {
2688 krb5_free_principal(context, principal);
2693 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
2695 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2701 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
2702 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2703 struct sdb_entry *entry)
2705 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
2706 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
2708 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
2709 krb5_error_code ret;
2710 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
2715 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
2718 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
2721 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
2727 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
2730 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
2734 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
2738 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
2743 krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
2745 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
2746 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
2747 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2748 "(objectClass=user)");
2750 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2752 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
2755 priv->count = res->count;
2756 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
2759 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
2761 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
2765 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
2767 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2772 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
2773 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2774 struct sdb_entry *entry)
2776 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
2779 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
2781 * The safest way to determine 'self' is to check the DB record made at
2782 * the time the principal was presented to the KDC.
2785 samba_kdc_check_client_matches_target_service(krb5_context context,
2786 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry_client,
2787 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry_server_target)
2789 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
2790 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
2791 TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
2793 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(frame,
2794 skdc_entry_client->msg,
2796 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(frame,
2797 skdc_entry_server_target->msg,
2801 * Allow delegation to the same record (representing a
2802 * principal), even if by a different name. The easy and safe
2803 * way to prove this is by SID comparison
2805 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
2807 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
2814 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
2815 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
2816 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
2820 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
2821 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2822 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
2823 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
2825 krb5_error_code ret;
2826 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
2827 struct ldb_message *msg;
2828 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
2829 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
2830 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
2834 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
2838 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
2842 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
2843 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
2844 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
2847 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2851 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, skdc_entry->msg, "objectSid");
2852 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
2854 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
2855 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
2857 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
2858 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2859 #if defined(KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH) /* MIT */
2860 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
2861 #else /* Heimdal (where this is an enum) */
2862 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
2866 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2871 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
2875 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
2876 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
2877 struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
2878 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
2880 krb5_error_code ret;
2882 const char *client_dn = NULL;
2883 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
2884 struct ldb_message_element *el;
2889 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
2893 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2894 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2895 " talloc_named() failed!");
2899 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(skdc_entry->msg->dn);
2905 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2906 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2907 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
2911 el = ldb_msg_find_element(skdc_entry->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
2916 SMB_ASSERT(el->num_values != 0);
2919 * This is the Microsoft forwardable flag behavior.
2921 * If the proxy (target) principal is NULL, and we have any authorized
2922 * delegation target, allow to forward.
2924 if (target_principal == NULL) {
2930 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
2931 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
2933 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
2934 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
2937 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
2938 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
2940 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2941 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2942 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2943 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
2946 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
2949 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
2951 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
2953 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2954 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2955 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
2959 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
2961 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
2962 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
2963 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
2966 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
2970 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
2971 (const char *)val2->data,
2986 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
2988 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2992 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2993 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
2994 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
2996 target_principal_name);
2997 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2998 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
3002 * This method is called for S4U2Proxy requests and implements the
3003 * resource-based constrained delegation variant, which can support
3004 * cross-realm delegation.
3006 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd(
3007 krb5_context context,
3008 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
3009 krb5_const_principal client_principal,
3010 krb5_const_principal server_principal,
3011 krb5_pac header_pac,
3012 struct samba_kdc_entry *proxy_skdc_entry)
3014 krb5_error_code code;
3015 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
3016 char *client_name = NULL;
3017 char *server_name = NULL;
3018 const char *proxy_dn = NULL;
3019 const DATA_BLOB *data = NULL;
3020 struct security_descriptor *rbcd_security_descriptor = NULL;
3021 struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL;
3022 struct auth_session_info *session_info = NULL;
3023 uint32_t session_info_flags = AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES;
3024 uint32_t access_desired = SEC_ADS_GENERIC_ALL; /* => 0x000f01ff */
3025 uint32_t access_granted = 0;
3027 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL;
3029 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx,
3031 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd");
3032 if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
3039 proxy_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(proxy_skdc_entry->msg->dn);
3040 if (proxy_dn == NULL) {
3041 DBG_ERR("ldb_dn_get_linearized failed for proxy_dn!\n");
3042 TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
3051 rbcd_security_descriptor = talloc_zero(mem_ctx,
3052 struct security_descriptor);
3053 if (rbcd_security_descriptor == NULL) {
3060 code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context,
3062 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
3065 DBG_ERR("Unable to parse client_principal!\n");
3069 code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context,
3071 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
3074 DBG_ERR("Unable to parse server_principal!\n");
3075 SAFE_FREE(client_name);
3079 DBG_INFO("Check delegation from client[%s] to server[%s] via "
3085 code = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx,
3095 if (user_info_dc->info->authenticated) {
3096 session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED;
3099 nt_status = auth_generate_session_info(mem_ctx,
3105 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
3106 code = map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
3110 data = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(proxy_skdc_entry->msg,
3111 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity");
3113 DBG_ERR("Could not find security descriptor"
3114 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity in "
3117 code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
3121 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(
3124 rbcd_security_descriptor,
3125 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_security_descriptor);
3126 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
3127 errno = ndr_map_error2errno(ndr_err);
3128 DBG_ERR("Failed to unmarshall "
3129 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity "
3130 "security descriptor of proxy[%s]\n",
3132 code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
3136 if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
3137 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_token, session_info->security_token);
3138 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, rbcd_security_descriptor);
3141 nt_status = sec_access_check_ds(rbcd_security_descriptor,
3142 session_info->security_token,
3148 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
3149 DBG_WARNING("RBCD: sec_access_check_ds(access_desired=%#08x, "
3150 "access_granted:%#08x) failed with: %s\n",
3153 nt_errstr(nt_status));
3155 code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
3159 DBG_NOTICE("RBCD: Access granted for client[%s]\n", client_name);
3163 SAFE_FREE(client_name);
3164 SAFE_FREE(server_name);
3166 TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
3170 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
3171 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
3174 struct ldb_message *msg;
3175 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
3176 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
3177 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
3178 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
3181 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
3182 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
3185 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
3186 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
3187 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
3189 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
3190 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
3191 kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx = base_ctx->msg_ctx;
3193 /* get default kdc policy */
3194 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(mem_ctx,
3196 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
3197 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
3198 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
3200 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
3201 if (session_info == NULL) {
3202 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3205 /* Setup the link to secrets.ldb */
3207 kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db = secrets_db_connect(kdc_db_ctx,
3209 if (kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db == NULL) {
3210 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: "
3211 "Cannot open secrets.ldb for KDC backend!"));
3212 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3213 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3216 kdc_db_ctx->fx_cookie_dn = ldb_dn_new(kdc_db_ctx,
3217 kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db,
3220 /* Setup the link to LDB */
3221 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx,
3227 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
3228 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
3229 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3230 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3233 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
3234 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
3235 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
3236 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
3237 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
3238 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3239 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3241 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
3242 int my_krbtgt_number;
3243 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
3244 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
3245 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
3247 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
3248 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
3249 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3250 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3253 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
3254 "serverReference", &account_dn);
3255 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
3256 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
3257 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
3258 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3259 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3262 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
3263 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
3264 talloc_free(account_dn);
3265 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
3266 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
3267 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
3268 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3269 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3272 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
3273 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
3275 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
3276 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
3277 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
3278 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
3279 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
3280 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
3281 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
3282 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3283 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3285 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
3286 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
3287 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
3288 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
3290 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3291 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3293 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
3296 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
3297 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
3299 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
3302 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
3303 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
3305 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
3306 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
3307 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
3308 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
3310 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
3311 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
3314 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
3315 return NT_STATUS_OK;